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THE EMPLOYMENT OF U. S. MARINES
IN LEBANON 1982 - 1984

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JEFFREY R. WILLIS, MAJ, USMC
B. S., Oklahoma State University,
Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1978



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

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ABSTRACT

EMPLOYMENT OF U. S. MARINES IN LEBANON 1982 - 1984 by Major Jeffrey R. Willis, USMC, 130 pages.

This study examines the employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 to determine if their use supported stated national objectives, national policy, and political objectives. The movement away from traditional concepts of employment of military forces creates difficulties for policymakers and military decisionmakers. Military missions and objectives may lose clarity as the U.S. attempts to achieve its objectives in operations short of war. This study delves into one attempt by the U.S. to achieve its objectives by the employment of military forces in operations short of war.

The area of interest is reviewed to include a general overview of the history of Lebanon. U.S. objectives in Lebanon and the region are examined along with factors leading to the decision to employ military forces in Lebanon. The Marine presence in Lebanon is addressed for the entire eighteen month period they were deployed. Particular emphasis is placed on assigned missions and general operations.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In August 1982 the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit landed in Beirut to assist in the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. On 10 September, with this mission complete, the Marines were ordered out of Beirut by the President of the United States. Only 19 days later, following the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the Marines returned to Beirut to join 2,200 French and Italian troops to form a multi national peacekeeping force. The U.S. Marines would remain a permanent presence in Lebanon until February of 1984. The purpose of this study is not to provide a history of U.S. Marine operations in Lebanon, nor is it another examination of the terrorist bombing of the Marine battalion headquarters in October 1983. A large amount of literature on U.S. Marine operations in Lebanon during this period is devoted to the bombing incident that took the lives of 241 American servicemen, of which 220 were U.S. Marines. This incident served as a catalyst for many people to ask the question, "Why were the Marines in Lebanon?"

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon from 1982 through 1984 to determine if their use supported stated national objectives, national policy, and political objectives. Peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations often enter an arena that is not as clearly defined as other military operations. This may force military leaders at all levels to confront issues and situations for which they may have had very little training or exposure. There is a strong possibility that the future holds many peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations for the United States Marine Corps and other U.S. military services. Perhaps this study can provide some insights and lessons for both military and civilian planners and decisionmakers. Because of the complex military and political issues that these operations often raise, and to avoid different interpretations, numerous definitions are provided to prevent any misunderstanding of terms. These definitions will be used throughout this thesis except where noted.

Branches - Contingencies of operational actions that may be pursued outside the original concept of operations but that may still achieve the desired operational objectives.¹

Chain of Command - The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel.²

Coercion - The attempt to enforce desired behavior on individuals, groups, or governments.³

Consolidation Operations - An operation organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. Normally conducted at the state level, this operation integrates counterinsurgency programs designed to establish, maintain, or restore host nation governmental control of the population in the area and to provide an environment within which the economic, political, and social activities of the populace can be pursued and improved.⁴

Crisis - A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U. S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.⁵

Crisis Action Procedures - Crisis action procedures define the process the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, services, and Department of Defense agencies use to develop timely recommendations and implement the decisions of the NCA

concerning the deployment and employment of military forces. These procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of the crisis and progressing through the employment of US military forces.⁶

Deterrence - The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.⁷

Doctrine (Department of Defense) - Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.⁸

End State - Military conditions established by the operational commander that must be attained to support national strategic goals. Theater strategy should clearly describe these desired successful conditions. In areas of operation where multiple elements of power interact and where economic, social, and politico-military conditions are dynamic, the end state should be carefully defined and consonant with NCA guidance.⁹

Mandate - A commission, authorization, or charter of authority given to a person or organization to carry out specific responsibilities.¹⁰

Mission (Department of Defense) - 1. The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.¹¹

National Objectives - Those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation - as opposed to the means for seeking these ends - toward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.¹²

National Policy - A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.¹³

National Security - A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.¹⁴

National Strategy - The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.¹⁵

Operational Art - The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or in a theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.¹⁶

Operational Level of War - The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operation. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.¹⁷

Peacekeeping Operations - Military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of a conflict between belligerents.¹⁸

Peacemaking Operations - A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.¹⁹

Peacetime Contingency Operations - Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war.²⁰

Political Actions - Diplomacy; communication with a foreign government or group to persuade or compel it to support one's own policies, by means of argument, promises, and threats.²¹

Sequel - A contingency for operational sequences that will follow the initial planned operation to take advantage of friendly successes and to limit the impact of enemy successes.²²

Termination Objectives - Specific objectives that define the intended manner of conflict termination and the required military and diplomatic achievements to obtain it.²³

If the future does hold the promise for more peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations the study of past operations will prove helpful. Planners at all levels need to understand the capabilities of military forces in peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations in support of political objectives. Military leaders will need to acknowledge the requirements for training, equipping, restructuring forces, and refining techniques as our doctrine concerning these types of operations evolves.

Civilian and military leaders should be able to identify those political objectives that can be translated into viable military missions.

Chapter Two will review the area of interest to include a general overview of the history of Lebanon. How the modern state of Lebanon came into being, to include independence and its unique constitution will be covered. Intervention from without has played a significant role in modern Lebanon, including U.S. involvement in 1958 and the events of the 1970's and 1980's that preceded U. S. involvement in 1982. Major national, political, and religious factions operating in Lebanon will be covered. The main actors in Lebanon and their objectives will be examined from the standpoint of the United States at the time of U.S. involvement in Lebanon in 1982. This chapter considers the complexity of the problems and past U.S. policy toward Lebanon.

National strategy, national objectives, and political objectives of the United States with regard to Lebanon and the surrounding region will be the topic of Chapter Three. Factors leading to the decision to employ U.S. Marines in Lebanon will be addressed and U.S. vital interests in the Lebanon will be identified. Chapter Three will also address regional threats, and foreign policy with Israel and Syria. This chapter will identify options

available, why action was required, stated political objectives throughout the period Marines were employed in Lebanon, and the foreign policy endstate desired. Finally, the formation and insertion of the Multi-National Force will be covered.

Chapter Four will address the U.S. Marine presence in Lebanon for the entire eighteen month period. Areas covered include the chain of command, assigned missions, mission analysis, and general operations in Lebanon.

Chapter Five analyzes the U.S. political objectives and the translation of these objectives into military missions assigned to U.S. Marines. Each political objective will be compared to each military mission to decide whether the mission supports the political objective. The analysis will determine whether these political objectives were sufficiently well defined in a manner that allowed them to be translated into military missions. Military missions and military objectives assigned by all echelons of the chain of command will be addressed as will U. S. national policy and national objectives affected by events in Lebanon.

Chapter Six will attempt to draw conclusions from the analysis in Chapter Five. The question that should be answered is: "Did the employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon from 1982 - 1984 support national policy

objectives?" Based on the analysis of Chapter Five, and the research conducted for Chapters Three and Four, recommendations may be possible about current doctrine, training, organization, types of forces to employ, education, and effective communication between civilian and military leaders.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

1. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, "Draft AFSC Pub 2" (Norfolk, Virginia: AFSC, 1992), G-3. AFSC Pub 1 is the textbook in use at the Armed Forces Staff College and has been used at other educational institutions and joint staffs as a reference book. "Draft AFSC Pub 2" is intended to supplement AFSC Pub 1. Neither publication is doctrine, rather they are intended to be used as textbooks. Material in both comes from official and unofficial sources.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: JCS, 1989), 63.

3. U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Headquarters Departments of the Army and Air Force, 5 December 1990), Glossary 1.

4. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 2.

5. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 2.

6. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 2.

7. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 3.

8. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 3.

9. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, "Draft AFSC Pub 2," G-6.

10. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 5.

11. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 235.

12. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 244.

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16. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, "Draft AFSC Pub 2," G-10.

17. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, "Draft AFSC Pub 2," G-10.

18. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 6.

19. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 6.

20. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 6.

21. FM 100-20 (1990), Glossary 6.

22. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, "Draft AFSC Pub 2," G-12.

23. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, "Draft AFSC Pub 2," G-13.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND ON LEBANON

Since the passing of glory days of Phoenicia Lebanon has been dominated by numerous civilizations and countries. This includes the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, and French. This chapter provides a brief overview of Lebanon's history to include its formation as a modern state, its independence, and its unique constitution. Although a thorough review of Lebanon's history is not possible in one short chapter, sufficient background on Lebanon is necessary to understand the complexity of the problems facing those involved in the events of 1982 through 1984 in Lebanon.

Lebanon first appeared in recorded history around 3000 B.C. The Lebanese were semitic people, known as Canaanites, who inhabited a group of coastal cities with a forested hinterland. Called Phoenicians by the Greeks, each of its coastal cities was an independent kingdom. Over time Lebanon assumed an important position as a

trading center because of its proximity to the sea. The Phoenicians excelled at navigation and they established trade routes to western Africa and Europe and established colonies throughout the Mediterranean Sea littoral.¹ The period from 875 B.C. to 634 A.D. saw the Lebanese coastal city states dominated by the Assyrians, Babylonians, and the Persian Empire under Cyrus and his successors until the Persian Empire eventually fell to Alexander the Great. Upon Alexander's death, and the division of his empire, modern day Lebanon came under the rule of the Macedonian general, Seleucus I and his successors. This Seleucid dynasty finally ended in 64 B.C. when the Romans added Phoenicia to its empire.²

By the third century Lebanon was almost completely Christianized, a result of Roman domination during this period, as Christianity triumphed under the rule of Constantine the Great.³ Lebanon, and particularly the Phoenician coastal cities, flourished during the Roman Empire as economic prosperity returned to Lebanon. In the sixth century a series of natural disasters struck Lebanon and, coupled with the corruption and disorganization of the Roman Empire, allowed a new force to dominate Lebanon.

The Arab period began in 632 when the forces of Islam descended on the area surrounding Lebanon. A result of economic necessity and religious beliefs, these

followers of Muhammad were determined to establish religious and civil control throughout the eastern Mediterranean area.

When the Arabs defeated the forces of Constantinople at the Battle of Yarmuk, the Arab Muawiya became governor of Syria, an area that included present day Lebanon. Muawiya founded the Umayyad dynasty that lasted from 660 to 750. While governor, Muawiya garrisoned troops on the coast of Lebanon and some Arab tribes settled on Lebanese and Syrian coastal areas.⁴ During this period the Christians of the Maronite community, led by Yuhanna Marun (Joanes Maro), withdrew to strongholds in Mount Lebanon and formed a separate nation.⁵ In early 750 the Abbasids replaced the Umayyads.

The Abbasids were founded by an Arab, Abul Abbas, and their harsh treatment of Syria and Lebanon as conquered countries sparked several revolts. Although the Abbasid rule lasted until 1258 it was a period characterized by regional and ethnic conflict in Lebanon and Syria. From 1095 until 1291 the Crusaders attempted to retake the holy lands from the Muslims for the Christians of Western Europe. Although they established no permanent presence in the region, they acquainted the Maronite Christians with European influence. Two other groups attempting to gain dominance in the area were the Mongols from the steppes of

Central Asia and the Mamluks from Egypt. The Mamluks eventually emerged as the victors from among these groups.⁶

The importance of the Arab rule of the Umayyads and Abbasids can be seen today in the demographic composition of modern day Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean area. Various religious and ethnic groups established themselves in Lebanon during this period of Arab rule. Several Christian communities, including the ancestors of present day Maronites, settled in Lebanon.⁷ Settlers in the Mount Lebanon area included a religious group that was an offshoot of Islam called the Druze, who followed the teachings of Darazi. Darazi was a follower of Al-Hakim, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt who proclaimed himself an incarnation of God.⁸ Another religious group that migrated to Lebanon during this period were Shia Muslims from Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula.

The Mamluks, brought to Egypt as bodyguards by Egyptian sultans, ruled Egypt and Syria, including Lebanon, for more than two centuries. The Mamluks were a combination of Turkoman and Circassian slaves, one of whom assassinated the Ayyubid sultan in 1252 and founded the Mamluk sultanate. They successfully defended their rule against invasions by the Crusaders and Mongols and also quelled rebellions by the Shia Muslims and Druzes during their reign. The Shias moved to southern Lebanon during this

time to escape repression and massacre by the Mamluks.⁹ Economic growth and overall prosperity for Lebanon continued, despite the conflicts in the area, until the Ottoman Turks ended the Mamluk rule.

The Ottomans, through two great Druze feudal families, the Maans and the Shihabs, ruled Lebanon until the middle of the nineteenth century. It was during the Ottoman rule that the term Greater Syria was coined to designate the approximate area included in present day Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.¹⁰

A Central Asian people who served as slaves and warriors under the Abbasids, the Ottoman Turks eventually became the masters and defeated both the Persians and Mamluks. They ruled from 1516 - 1916. This period in Lebanese history was one of semiautonomous rule, bitter religious conflicts, and the end of Maronite-Druze solidarity.

Following bitter conflicts between Christians and Druzes, the European powers suggested to the Ottoman sultan that Lebanon should be divided into Christian and Druze sections and in 1842 the sultan agreed. An arrangement known as the Double Qaimaqamate divided Lebanon into a northern district, with a Christian deputy governor, and a southern district, with a Druze deputy governor. The governor of Sidon would be in charge of both the deputies and the Beirut-Damascus highway would be the dividing line. This division only intensified the conflicts between the

two groups and increased with the meddling of France, supporting the Christians; Britain, supporting the Druze; and the Ottomans who intended to increase their control as violence flared.

A peasant revolt in 1858, led by a Maronite peasant, against the feudal class of Mount Lebanon led to retaliation by Druze when the revolt expanded into the Druze district. In 1860 this bitter conflict culminated in the massacre of approximately 10,000 Maronites, Greek Catholics, and Greek Orthodox by the Druze. This led to foreign intervention and in 1860 an international commission of France, Britain, Austria, and Prussia met with the Ottoman Empire and recommended administrative and judicial changes for Lebanon. Mount Lebanon and Syria were separated and Mount Lebanon placed under the rule of a Christian governor-general who would rule for three years and who was to be appointed by the Ottoman sultan. The Ottomans ruled Lebanon through the end of World War I.¹¹

The outbreak of World War I caused Turkey to occupy Lebanon with military forces and abolish Lebanon's semiautonomous status. Turkey, siding with Germany and Austria-Hungary, established a blockade on the coast of Lebanon creating tremendous hardships on Lebanon during the war. Following the war, France was granted a mandate over Greater Syria, which included Lebanon, at the Conference of

San Remo held in Italy during April of 1920. In September of 1920 Greater Lebanon was established with its current boundaries and Beirut was designated as the capital.¹²

Lebanon's constitution was established on 23 May 1926 under the auspices of France to take effect on 1 September 1926. That constitution, with its four amendments, is in effect in Lebanon at the present time. Following a French model, the constitution created a unicameral parliament, called the Chamber of Deputies, a president, and a Council of Ministers. A president was to be elected by the Chamber of Deputies for three years (later this term was lengthened to six years). The Chamber of Deputies was popularly elected along confessional¹³ lines and the custom developed where major political officers were selected according to principal sects in population. The president would be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim. The only census ever taken in Lebanon was conducted in 1932.¹⁴

The constitution was suspended by the French in September 1939 with the outbreak of World War II. In 1940 the Vichy government came to power and appointed a French high commissioner to take charge in Lebanon. In protest, Emile Iddi, the Lebanese president elected in 1936, resigned and the French high commissioner appointed a new

head of state. Vichy control ended when Free French and British forces entered Syria and Lebanon. In July of 1941 an armistice was signed in Acre and in November of 1941 France proclaimed Lebanon's independence at the urging of Lebanese leaders. The United States, Great Britain, and other nations were quick to recognize the independence of Lebanon although France continued to exercise authority in Lebanon.¹⁵

General elections were held on 21 September 1943 and the new Chamber of Deputies selected Bishara al Khuri President. Khuri appointed Riyad as Sulh, Prime Minister, and a new government was formed. On 8 November 1943 the Chamber of Deputies passed an amendment abolishing those articles of the constitution that referred to the Mandate and modified those articles that had given the French High Commissioner special powers in an attempt to bring true independence to Lebanon. In response France arrested the President, Prime Minister, cabinet members, and other prominent Lebanese politicians. This united the Christian and Muslim leaders to rid Lebanon of the French authority. The United States, Great Britain, and the Arab countries immediately began pressuring France to release the Lebanese leaders. On 22 November, influenced by internal pressure as well, France released the Lebanese politicians. This ended the French Mandate period.¹⁶

The foundation of Lebanon as a new nation cannot be discussed without reviewing the importance of the "National Pact." This pact was an unwritten agreement between President Khuri, a Christian, and Prime Minister Sulh, a muslim. Presented in a series of meetings and speeches by the two men, its contents were agreed with and supported by their followers.

The National Pact laid down four principles. First, Lebanon was to be a completely independent state. The Christian communities were to cease identifying with the West; in return, the Muslim communities were to protect the independence of Lebanon and prevent its merger with any Arab state. Second, although Lebanon is an Arab country with Arabic as its official language, it could not cut off its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West, which had helped it attain such a notable degree of progress. Third, Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states, should cooperate with the other Arab states, and in case of conflict among them, it should not side with one against another. Fourth, public offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized religious groups, but in technical positions preference should be given to competence without regard to confessional considerations. Moreover, the three top government positions should be distributed as follows: the president of the republic should be a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shia Muslim. The ratio of deputies was to be six Christians to five Muslims.¹⁷

In 1949 Bishara al Khuri was reelected for a second six year term. In 1952 the people had become so dissatisfied with the corruption and favoritism in his government that he was forced to resign following a general strike in

Lebanon. The Chamber of Deputies elected Camille Chamoun (Shamun) to replace al Khuri on 23 September 1952. This period of unrest began with demands by Muslims for a new census.

The Muslims were not convinced that the Christians still had the largest population in Lebanon and they were dissatisfied that the Christians were holding the highest offices. There were numerous other factors contributing to unrest in Lebanon during this period: the invasion of Egypt by France, Great Britain, and Israel during the Suez Canal crisis; rivalry between political leaders along religious and clan lines; the struggle between those who supported Lebanese nationalism and those supporting Pan-Arabism; and the support of many Sunni leaders for Egyptian President Nasser and Pan-Arabism.¹⁸

President Chamoun's intent to seek an additional term in office required a constitutional amendment allowing the incumbent president to succeed himself. Requiring a two-thirds vote by the Chamber of Deputies, a constitutional amendment would require Chamoun and his party to acquire a majority in the May-June 1957 elections. Although Chamoun's party obtained the necessary majority in the elections, the elections were marred by violence and contained a higher level of fraud than

normal. The level of discontent with the government rose steadily, as did the violence throughout Lebanon.¹⁹

The 1957 elections in Lebanon were not considered valid by many Muslims and others opposed to Chamoun. The failure to conduct a census and the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in nearby Iraq increased tensions between Christians and Muslims. Fearing that he was losing control, in July 1958 Chamoun requested that the United States intervene militarily in Lebanon.

President Chamoun's request for U.S. military intervention was based on invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine²⁰ which Lebanon had signed the previous year. Chamoun originally based his request on charges against Syria for supporting the insurrection movement in Lebanon with arms and advisors. Because Syria was receiving arms and aid from the Soviet Union, it had become a Soviet controlled nation in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Thus, Lebanon became eligible for assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine because it was endangered by communist-sponsored subversion.²¹

The actual events that triggered U.S. intervention were the 14 July 1958 coup d'etat in Iraq that ousted King Faisal, a staunch Western ally, followed by rumors that a coup would soon be attempted against King Hussein of Jordan. Chamoun, fearing that he might be next, demanded

U.S. military intervention within forty-eight hours. In meetings between President Eisenhower and his advisors, unilateral intervention was the type of response proposed. "Secretary of State Dulles elevated the immediate problem to a matter of national strategic principle, insisting that the time had come for the United States to meet head-on the challenges of the new Middle East."²²

On 15 July 1958 the first U.S. forces began arriving in Lebanon. A battalion of Marines landed in Beirut, established a beachhead, and secured the airport with instructions to establish control of the Port of Beirut when circumstances permitted. While the Marines were unsure of the threat they faced, neither U.S. nor Lebanese leaders appeared any more clearly informed of what constituted the threat.²³

16 July found the Marines and the Lebanese conducting combined motorized patrols in Beirut that assisted in calming the city. Although the Marines had landed two battalions by 16 July, with two more battalions scheduled to follow by 19 July, no actual military objectives had been established nor did any external forces appear to be invading Lebanon. Despite these conditions the U.S. continued to deploy personnel and material to Beirut and by 20 July the U.S. had 10,000 men with their equipment compressed into the vicinity of Beirut.²⁴

Eventually, the political complexities of the U.S. intervention were recognized by all concerned and the U.S. military forces assumed a passive role of neutrality, allowing the Lebanese political process to unfold in a fashion consistent with local practice. On 31 July General Shihab was elected president of Lebanon, with an inauguration date of 23 September. General Shihab had demonstrated his nonpartisanship during the strife while serving as commander in chief of the Lebanese Army.²⁵

The violence escalated again in late August and continued into September as the presence of U.S. forces became routine to the Lebanese populace. The reduction in violence was ultimately brought about by Shihab's conciliatory approach to government more than any other factor.²⁶

President Shihab instituted electoral reform and appointed a larger number of Muslims to leadership roles and cabinet positions. In September 1958 Shihab asked, and the United States agreed, to withdraw its forces by October 1958. Fighting among various factions during this period of unrest in 1958 caused between 2,000 and 4,000 casualties. Most of these casualties were Muslims in Beirut and Tripoli. During Shihab's term as president Lebanon enjoyed a general period of stability and economic growth. The period following Shihab's presidency was

characterized by increasing tensions between Muslims and Christians.²⁷

Charles Hilu was selected as president in August 1964 to serve a six year term. Although Lebanon did not participate in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the war was the catalyst for a period of unrest and tension in Lebanon. Following the war Palestinian guerrillas increasingly used southern Lebanon for attacks on Israel. In December 1968 Israel raided the Beirut International Airport, destroying thirteen airliners owned by Arab countries. This raid was conducted in retaliation for a PLO attack on an El Al airliner in Athens. Clashes between guerrillas and the Lebanese Army throughout 1969 created additional problems for the government because the Palestinians had numerous supporters in Lebanon. The guerrillas relocated their bases in southern Lebanon to locations that were better suited for attacks on Israel and the Israelis began to raid Palestinian bases inside Lebanon regularly.²⁸

The Lebanese Army attacks on Palestinian bases met with only minor success. In order to reduce Palestinian attacks into Israel from Lebanon and bring some quiet to the area, the commander of the Lebanese Army and Yasar Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization met in Cairo in 1969. They made a secret agreement that set limits on the number of Palestinian attacks into Israel from

Lebanon. During this period many Shias moved to Beirut from southern Lebanon to escape the Israeli shelling that was frequently taking place in southern Lebanon. The mainly Christian leadership of Lebanon failed to demonstrate concern for this group of people which created additional problems.²⁹

A Maronite leader from north Lebanon was selected as president by the Chamber of Deputies in August 1970. During the time Suleiman Franjeh was president Lebanon suffered a high rate of inflation and unemployment. As a result of clashes in Jordan between the Jordanian Army and Palestinian guerrillas, an increasing number of Palestinians entered Lebanon. These Palestinians filtered to southern Lebanon and a rise in violence between Palestinian guerrillas, operating out of southern Lebanon, and the Israelis was the result. Palestinian guerrillas would infiltrate into Israel for a raid which would be followed by Israeli retaliation raids on Palestinian bases inside Lebanon. The Lebanese government was powerless to deal with this problem and the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerrillas continued to clash.³⁰

On 13 April 1975 gunmen killed four members of the Phalange Party during an attempted assassination of Pierre Gemayel in Beirut. The Phalangists retaliated by attacking a bus carrying Palestinians killing twenty six

passengers. During the next several days the battle began in earnest as the Phalange and Palestinian militias fought and random killings began to occur. The government was paralyzed due to disagreements along confessional lines. In May Prime Minister Rashid as Sulh and his cabinet resigned. A new government was formed under Rashid Karami but the fighting began to spread throughout Lebanon and a civil war was underway. "Although the two warring factions were often characterized as Christian versus Muslim, their individual composition was far more complex."³¹

The 1975 Civil War in Lebanon featured numerous factions, sects, and clans, often with several splinter groups within the larger organizations. The warring sides can be broken down into two major groups. On one side was the Lebanese Front, composed primarily of Maronite militias, who favored the status quo. Opposing this group was the Lebanese National Movement, a more loosely knit group who favored change. This second group was led by Kamal Jumblatt and included splinter Palestinian organizations that were not part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and militias and guerrillas from various leftist organizations.³²

Syria was greatly concerned with these events in neighboring Lebanon and made numerous diplomatic attempts

to negotiate a truce. These attempts met with little success until February 1976 when Syria helped negotiate a reform program known as the Constitutional Document. The ability of this reform to bring calm to Lebanon was destroyed immediately by a mutiny within the Lebanese Army in March as some Muslim troops left the army and joined the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). This event destroyed Syria's political breakthrough and was followed by a Lebanese National Movement attack on the presidential palace which forced Franjiah out of power.

The Syrian attitude toward Lebanon can be viewed from several different perspectives. Although Syria does not officially question Lebanon's existence as a separate nation, unofficially, since 1976 Syria has in essence annexed portions of Lebanon. Prior to the establishment of Lebanon as a separate nation, Syria argued that it should remain part of Greater Syria, a goal which presently has many advocates in Syria. The ideology of the Baathist Party, the ruling party in Syria, envisions a single Arab nation that would remove the arbitrary borders established under the Ottoman Empire and European colonial periods. Whether the goal advocated is that of recovering territory that was once part of Greater Syria, Arab unification, or merely Syria's regional ambitions is arguable. For whatever reason, Syria has never hesitated to seek to

control Lebanon's affairs, either directly or indirectly.³³

Part of the justification for Syrian hegemony with regard to Lebanon is to protect its own national interests. The Syrians fear: a radical leftist government in Lebanon, the formation of an independent Christian state allied with Israel, and the possibility of Israeli forces situated along the Bekaa Valley, a natural invasion route into Syria.

Ilyas Sarkis was selected by the Chamber of Deputies in May to become president in September when Franjeh's term was over. Sarkis was unacceptable to the Lebanese National Movement because he was supported by Syria so the LNM continued to assault Christian-controlled areas. Syria was concerned that this continued fighting between the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Front would cause the creation of an independent Christian state in Mount Lebanon or a radical, hostile nation if the Lebanese National Movement won the war. Since both of these scenarios were unacceptable to Syria, in May 1976 Syria decided to intervene militarily.³⁴

Syrian forces struck the Lebanese National Movement in an attempt to quickly bring an end to the fighting. At first unsuccessful they launched another drive in July

against Lebanese National Movement strongholds. Within weeks Syria had defeated the Lebanese National Movement and a peace conference was conducted in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in October 1976. The Riyadh Conference formally ended the Lebanese Civil War although it did nothing to address the causes of the war. Syrian forces remained in Lebanon and a 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force was established consisting of 27,000 Syrian troops with the remainder from other Arab states.³⁵

From 1976 to 1982 Lebanon's problems continued. Although full scale warfare had stopped, the Lebanese Army was ineffective and Syrian forces remained in large numbers. Beirut was now divided into Muslim and Christian sectors instead of the integration that was prevalent prior to the civil war. Southern Lebanon continued to be a problem area and in August 1976 Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinians held a conference to discuss Palestinian activity in that area.

The result of this conference was the Shtawrah (Shaturah, Shtoura, Chtaura) Accord. Agreements reached under the Shtawrah Accord would have the Palestinians withdraw at least fifteen kilometers from the Israeli border and this area would be patrolled by the Lebanese Army. The Shtawrah Accord was never fully executed and in 1978 Israel launched an attack into southern Lebanon to

clear out Palestinian strongholds. The Israeli forces occupied positions as far north as the Litani River for over three months until replaced by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).³⁶

Throughout 1981 and 1982 the level of violence escalated as rival elements clashed. The Lebanese population became increasingly disillusioned with the various factions and their inability to control the violence within their area. The Palestine Liberation Organization, Lebanese National Movement, Lebanese Front, Amal, various Christian militias, and Syria all struggled to control sectors within Lebanon.³⁷

From 1978 to 1981 Bashir Gemayel consolidated his power among Maronite Christian elements, including an attack on the pro-Syrian Christian militia, and in some cases direct attacks against Syrian forces. The Syrians retaliated by shelling Phalangist strongholds in Al Ashrafiyah prior to moving into that area. The Israelis threatened Syria by massing forces on the Golan Heights and Israeli jets overflew Syrian positions. This signal that the Israelis were prepared to protect the Maronite Christians was not lost on Syria and Syria withdrew its forces. During the middle and late 1970's the Israelis provided considerable support to various Maronite Christian groups within the Maronite community. The major recipient

of this support was Pierre Gemayel and the Phalange Party. The militia of the Phalange Party had been fostered by the Israelis since the 1975 civil war in Lebanon.³⁸ By 1980 Gemayel had become the dominant force in the Maronite military.

During the winter and early spring of 1981 the Phalange militia and the Syrians were engaged in a restrained conflict near Zahlah (Zhale) adjacent to Syrian occupied areas. The Phalange were intent on increasing their area of influence prior to the upcoming presidential elections in Lebanon. Their goal was to prevent the election of the Syrian backed candidate, Suleiman Franjeh. This conflict escalated late in the Spring as Syria became concerned about the increasing military ascendancy of the Phalange and other Christian factions in the Christian controlled areas. In March the Phalange militia inflicted heavy casualties on a Syrian unit trapped in Zahlah. Syria responded with indiscriminate shelling of the town wreaking heavy civilian casualties among the town's population. Gemayel requested and received support from the Israelis in the form of an air strike in April 1981 and the Israeli Air Force downed two Syrian helicopters. This action brought to light the previously surreptitious alliance between the Phalange and Israel.³⁹

These events seriously increased tensions in the area. Syria had previously refrained from deploying antiaircraft missiles in Lebanon and had never interfered with Israeli reconnaissance flights. In response to the Israeli air attack Syria began deploying SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) near Zahlah in Lebanon and increased the number of antiaircraft systems on the Syrian side of the border. Israel stated an intention to destroy these SAM sites but the United States dissuaded the Israelis from taking any action. This forced the Israelis to accept an intolerable change in the balance of combat power in the area and provided for continued tensions between Israel and Syria.

Throughout 1981 and 1982 a reorganization and strengthening of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) had taken place. The PLA was armed and controlled by the Syrians and more closely resembled a conventional force than did other militia or factions of the PLO. Although they were nominally aligned with the PLO, the PLA was responsive to Syrian direction. Simultaneously, the PLO was increasing shelling of Israel from southern Lebanon. One such artillery barrage resulted in an air attack by Israel on Beirut in which numerous civilian casualties occurred. Ambassador Habib was detached to negotiate a cease fire agreement and a truce was established in

southern Lebanon. Israel was then forced into uneasily watching this increase in PLO military strength but was unable to take action due to the truce.

Following an attempt to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Britain by the Abu Nidal Organization, an organization that had split with the PLO, Israel retaliated with air strikes on Palestinian targets in West Beirut. Israel claimed that this event constituted a breach of the truce agreement that had been negotiated in July. The Palestinians responded by shelling Israeli settlements in northern Galilee.

On 6 June 1982 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched an attack into Lebanon known as "Operation Peace for Galilee." The Israeli cabinet had imposed strict limits on the operation: the IDF was to advance no further than forty kilometers, the operation was to last only twenty four hours, Syrian forces were not to be attacked, and Beirut was not to be approached.⁴⁰

The Israelis advanced rapidly on the first day before running into fierce Palestinian resistance, especially near Ayn al Hulwah camp near Sidon, where several hundred Palestinian fighters fought to the last man, delaying the IDF advance for seven days. During the next five days the Israelis advanced into the Syrian held portion of Lebanon and battled the Syrian forces, in the process virtually

destroying the Syrian Air Force. The IDF was on the verge of breaking through the last line of Syrian defense when Israel and Syria agreed to a truce negotiated by the United States.⁴¹

This 11 June cease fire began a new phase that would include a siege of Beirut by Israel to drive the PLO out of Lebanon, and it would involve the United States both diplomatically and militarily.

The complexity of the situation in Lebanon at this time is evident. Numerous nations and groups internal and external to Lebanon all had a stake in the outcome. In addition to Israel and Syria, the United States and Iran also played a part in events in Lebanon. Factions within Lebanon were the Palestinian Liberation Organization; the Phalange Party; the South Lebanon Army; Shia groups included the Amal, Islamic Amal, Hizballah, Jundallah, Husayn Suicide Commandos, the Dawah Party, and the Islamic Jihad Organization; the Syrian founded National Salvation Front (NSF) comprised of the Druzes, Shias led by Nabih Birri, Sunni Muslims, and Franjieh led Christian elements.

Each of these actors played a part in the events in Lebanon, each working toward its own interests. Israel and Syria both feeling their vital interests were at stake and interfering in Lebanese affairs highlighted the inability of the National Pact in time of crises to rescue Lebanon

from the problems associated with its confessional form of government.

Several factors should be evident at this time from viewing Lebanon's history. Similar to other nations, particularly in the Middle East, Lebanon was created by colonial powers rather than evolving into a nation on its own. Its borders reflect neither natural nor national boundaries but the desires of the French to protect the Christians by enlarging and shaping the boundaries to ensure a Christian dominated nation. When France created Greater Lebanon out of Greater Syria during its mandate it planted the seed for an uneasy future relationship between Lebanon and Syria. Due to the numerous factions and groups that sought refuge in Lebanon to achieve freedom of expression, Lebanon consists of a wide range of diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious groups. The various factions tend to identify with their more narrow clan or group than with Lebanon the nation and the National Pact of 1943 has helped to maintain that focus. Lebanon was built on shaky demographic and political foundations and its survival is tied to political compromise and power sharing among its various groups.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

1. Thomas Collelo, ed., Lebanon: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1987), 3 - 4.
2. Collelo, Lebanon, 3 - 7.
3. Nassib S. Eid, "Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System" (MMAS Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1983), 14.
4. Collelo, Lebanon, 7 - 8.
5. Nassib, "Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System," 19.
6. Collelo, Lebanon, 9 - 11.
7. Collelo, Lebanon, 8. The followers of Saint John Maron settled in the northern Lebanon Mountains to avoid feuds with other Christian sects.
8. Nassib, "Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System," 21.
9. Collelo, Lebanon, 11.
10. Collelo, Lebanon, 12.
11. Collelo, Lebanon, 12 - 16.
12. Collelo, Lebanon, 17 - 18.
13. Confessional, or Confessionalism: Generally refers to believing in, or adhering to a common faith or religion. Frequently in Lebanon it acquired a narrower focus than just religion. Instead of Christian or Muslim it more narrowly identified an individual with a sect or clan. Examples include: Maronite Christians, Sunni, Shia, Druze.
14. Collelo, Lebanon, 17 - 19.
15. Collelo, Lebanon, 19 - 20.
16. Collelo, Lebanon, 19 - 20.

17. Collelo, Lebanon, 20 - 21.
18. Collelo, Lebanon, 21 - 24.
19. See Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Paper Number 3 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 2 - 6; Collelo, Lebanon, 23 - 24.
20. Under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine the United States would "use armed forces to assist any [Middle East] nation...requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." This included communist-backed subversion. Collelo, Lebanon, 23 - 24.
21. See Spiller, "Not War But Like War", 2 - 17; Collelo, Lebanon, 22 - 24.
22. Spiller, "Not War But Like War", 17.
23. Spiller, "Not War But Like War", 20.
24. Spiller, "Not War But Like War", 25, 34.
25. See Collelo, Lebanon, 21 - 24; Spiller, "Not War But Like War", 38 - 44.
26. Spiller, "Not War But Like War", 43 - 44.
27. Collelo, Lebanon, 21 - 24.
28. See Collelo, Lebanon, 24 - 26; Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Israel: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), 275 - 277.
29. Collelo, Lebanon, 24 - 26.
30. Collelo, Lebanon, 26 - 29.
31. Collelo, Lebanon, 29 - 30.
32. Collelo, Lebanon, 29 - 30.
33. Thomas Collelo, ed., Syria: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1988), 187, 195, 196, 216 - 220.
34. Collelo, Lebanon, 30 - 31.

35. Collelo, Lebanon, 31 - 32.
36. Collelo, Lebanon, 32 - 34.
37. Collelo, Lebanon, 32 - 36.
38. M. Thomas Davis, 40km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 60, 101. By 1982 they had established a close working relationship in an effort to suppress the activities and impact of the PLO.
39. Although Israel kept its promise to Gemayel that it would not allow the Syrian Air Force to operate against the Phalange militia, they also sent a clear message, via an emissary, that Israel would not be drawn into a war with Syria by the Phalange. See M. Thomas Davis, 40km Into Lebanon, 63; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970 - 1985 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 115 - 117.
40. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon is a complex topic all by itself. Several works offer plausible reasons or explanations why the IDF exceeded the limits imposed by the Israeli Cabinet. Other authors argue that the plan all along was for the IDF to drive the PLO out of Lebanon or destroy them. See M. Thomas Davis, 40km Into Lebanon, 76 - 105; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970 - 1985, 121 - 173; Richard Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill and Wang, Inc., 1984).
41. See Collelo, Lebanon, 200 - 206; Metz, Israel, 262 - 266; Collelo, Syria, 243 - 245; Davis, 40km Into Lebanon; Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon 1970 - 1985; Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee. Davis and Gabriel offer the best study of military operations, Rabinovich and Davis the best coverage of political considerations.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

On 26 May 1982 Secretary of State Alexander Haig addressed the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. His topic was "Peace and Security in the Middle East." This address focused on the importance and strategic value of the Middle East, the diplomatic efforts of the United States in that area, and the challenges in the area to policies of the United States. This speech is particularly timely since it took place a short time before the Israeli attack into Lebanon on 6 June 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee).¹

Secretary Haig's comments reviewed the recent history of regional issues that concerned the United States: the danger of local and superpower competition in the nuclear age; the necessity of shaping events in the Middle East to attain a more peaceful international order; resolution of conflicts without resorting to force; and maintaining the Camp David accords to prevent another Arab-Israeli war.²

The Secretary of State next discussed the challenges that would require a change in the approach to problems in the Middle East by the United States. One of these challenges was the increasing influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States was particularly troubled by the increasing Soviet influence along the sea lanes and vital approaches to the region. Included in this influence were Soviet and Cuban participation in local conflicts that were undermining the peace process, regional security, and vital Western interests.³

A second challenge was the situation in Iran. Not only had Iran suffered an upheaval with the displacement of the Shah but, the Islamic government that replaced the Shah appeared to desire revolution throughout the Middle East. Coupled with this was the invasion of Iran by Iraq, with the Soviet Union providing arms to both sides in this conflict. This struggle threatened the security of the region and jeopardized the flow of oil from the region. Western interests were menaced by the loss of stability in this area and the peril to the flow of oil created by that loss of stability.⁴

Intervention of outside forces and civil conflict in Lebanon were identified by Secretary Haig as challenges to American policy. Events in Lebanon had degraded the

authority of the Lebanese Government, aggravated inter-Arab relations, and threatened to involve Israel and Syria in war. Added to this was the fragile state of the peace process initiated by the Camp David accords. Israel and Egypt were in disagreement over the role and composition of the multinational force in the Sinai, many Arab states were opposed to the Camp David accords and Egypt's peace with Israel, and Palestinians were against recognizing Israel's right to live in peace.⁵

Meeting these challenges would require that the United States demonstrate the ability to protect friends and help them protect themselves; take initiatives on the peace process and in regional conflicts to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting these events for their own strategic purposes; and assist countries friendly to the United States in countering threats to their security.⁶

Within the overall framework of the Middle East Lebanon had taken on an importance much greater than its size or location would merit. The crisis in Lebanon provided the conditions that might ignite an Arab-Israeli conflict, reduce stability in the region, and destroy the chances for a broader Middle East peace.

Prior to 1982 the United States had been involved in diplomatic efforts to deter military confrontation in Lebanon. The April 1981 cessation of hostilities was

negotiated by Ambassador Habib (President's special emissary to the Middle East Philip C. Habib) in the Lebanese-Israeli area along with a cease-fire. To reduce the chance of conflict in Lebanon Secretary of State Haig stated:

The time has come to take concerted action in support of both Lebanon's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and a strong central government capable of promoting a free, open, democratic, and traditionally pluralistic society.⁷

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 1982 Secretary of State Haig continued to outline the objectives and policies of the United States in the region. On 13 June 1982 the Secretary expressed concern about the conditions that precipitated the Israeli invasion and discussed requirements necessary to stabilize the situation in Lebanon. He also reiterated the major points from his speech in Chicago on the three interrelated areas of concern with which the United States must deal effectively: the peace process initiated at Camp David, the highly volatile situation in Lebanon, and the spread of the Iranian fundamentalist movement. On 19 June 1982 Secretary Haig commented on the situation in Lebanon and the efforts of the United States in creating conditions that would strengthen the sovereignty of the central government of Lebanon.⁸ In response to a question on

the position of the United States regarding Lebanon the Secretary had the following comment:

The U. S. view is, of course, that we would like to see ultimately all foreign forces out of Lebanon so that the central government can conduct the sovereign affairs of a sovereign government within internationally recognized borders.⁹

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the United States actively sought a settlement among the parties involved in Lebanon. Ambassador Habib shuttled throughout the area to different capitals attempting to end the hostilities and achieve a diplomatic settlement. At this time the Israelis were involved in the siege of Beirut.

Determined to drive the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) out of Beirut, the Israelis maintained a siege of Beirut for seventy days. Although the United States had negotiated a truce between Israel and Syria this did not apply to the PLO forces in Beirut. During this seventy day period the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) continuously shelled Beirut with artillery and naval gunfire while the Israeli Air Force conducted air attacks. The mounting civilian casualties were politically damaging to the Israeli government but they appeared resolved to remove the PLO from Beirut once and for all. Lebanese leaders finally requested that the PLO

withdraw from Beirut to spare further civilian suffering.¹⁰

During the early days of August the President of the United States stressed the need for the end to hostilities in the region in several White House Statements and President's Statements. He reiterated his support for Ambassador Habib's mission and the necessity for quick diplomatic settlement of the problem in west Beirut to begin a broader peace process.

When Israeli forces moved from their cease fire positions and again began shelling Beirut, the President was quick to make a statement condemning these actions as delaying Ambassador Habib's progress in negotiating the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut. Ambassador Habib continued his shuttle diplomacy throughout the region in spite of these actions. In addition to creating favorable conditions for the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut, Ambassador Habib was continually required to use his diplomatic skills to maintain the cease-fire.¹¹

On 2nd August the President issued a statement that announced an agreement between Lebanon, France, Italy, Israel, the United States, and the Palestine Liberation Organization for the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut. Portions of the President's statement are as follows:

Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, President's special emissary to the Middle East] has informed me that a plan to resolve the west Beirut crisis has been agreed upon by all the parties involved. As part of this plan, the Government of Lebanon has requested, and I have approved, the deployment of U.S. forces to Beirut as part of a multinational force (MNF)....

Our purpose will be to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibility for insuring the departure of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of U.S. forces also will facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government over the Beirut area. In no case will our troops stay longer than 30 days....¹²

The President's statement concluded that successful resolution of the crisis in West Beirut would enable international action that would "restore Lebanon's full sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity; obtain the rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country; and help insure the security of northern Israel."¹³ The President tied the resolution of the crisis in Beirut, as well as resolving the Palestinian issue and other Arab-Israeli conflicts, to the ability of the Camp David accords to achieve peace in the region.

The departure of the PLO was to begin on 21 August 1982 and involved the removal from Lebanon of all PLO leaders, combatants, and offices for prearranged destinations. The overall objective of the Government of Lebanon was the withdrawal of all foreign military forces

from Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon and the United States provided guarantees of safety for the departure of the PLO. The Lebanese Armed Forces were responsible for ensuring the safe departure of PLO personnel while France, Italy, and the United States formed a temporary multinational force - at the request of the Government of Lebanon - to provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces in this endeavor.¹⁴

The multinational force was comprised of approximately 800 French, 800 U.S., and 400 Italian military personnel operating in and around the Beirut area. The mission of the multinational force was to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out the safe departure of the PLO and providing safety for others during the evacuation. The U.S. participant in the multinational force (MNF) were Marines of the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit. The Marines were to enter Beirut after the evacuation had begun to perform their mission as part of the multinational force.¹⁵

In the President's letter to the Congress of 24 August 1982 he outlined: the plan for departure of the PLO, the U.S. agreement with the Government of Lebanon regarding U.S. participation as part of the MNF, under what conditions the U.S. forces would be withdrawn, and the prospects for realizing U.S. objectives in Lebanon. It is

this last part that is of particular importance to this study. The following is the conclusion to the President's letter:

This deployment of the United States Armed Forces to Lebanon is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

This step will not, by itself, resolve the situation in Lebanon, let alone the problems which have plagued the region for more than thirty years. But I believe that it will improve the prospects for realizing our objectives in Lebanon:

- a permanent cessation of hostilities;
 - establishment of a strong, representative central government;
 - withdrawal of all foreign forces;
 - restoration of control by the Lebanese Government throughout the country; and
- establishment of conditions under which Lebanon no longer can be used as a launching point for attacks against Israel.

I also believe that progress on the Lebanon problem will contribute to an atmosphere in the region necessary for progress towards the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region under Camp David, based firmly on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.¹⁶

The evacuation of the PLO which began on 21 August 1982 was completed by 1 September 1982. On 23 August Bashir Gemayel was elected President by the legislature and on 10 September the U.S. Marines withdrew from Lebanon. The other members of the MNF followed shortly thereafter. As

the Israelis began to withdraw their forces the Lebanese Army began to move into West Beirut. However, two events occurred in rapid succession that quickly destroyed any hopes for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Lebanon. On 14 September a radio-detonated explosion killed newly elected President Bashir Gemayel while he was delivering a speech to members of the Phalange Party. Amin Gemayel, Bashir's brother, was elected to replace him as president.

The second event took place beginning the evening of 16 September 1982. Members of the Christian militias from the Phalange Party and the Southern Lebanese Army (IDF supported militia) entered the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila. The camps were surrounded by the IDF and 300 to 400 militiamen entered the camps to locate and remove remnants of Palestinian forces. Over a two day period up to 800 Palestinian men, women, and children were massacred by the Christian militiamen. Although no IDF forces entered the camps, IDF officers reportedly supervised the operation from rooftops of nearby buildings.¹⁷

Responding to a request from the Government of Lebanon, the United States, France, and Italy agreed to the formation of new multinational force to return to Beirut for a limited period of time. The purpose of the force was

to allow the Lebanese Government to restore internal security in Beirut, bring an end to violence, and create conditions conducive to the withdrawal of all foreign forces. On 25 September 1982 Ambassador Dillon answered the formal request by the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon for participation of U.S. forces in the new multinational force:

I am pleased to inform you on behalf of my Government that the United States is prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately 1200 personnel as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) to establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. It is understood that the presence of such an American force will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, an objective which is fully shared by my Government, and thereby further efforts of the Government of Lebanon to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end the [sic] violence which has tragically recurred.¹⁸

On 8 September President Reagan reaffirmed the principle objectives of the United States with regard to Lebanon. In his remarks following a meeting with Ambassador Habib President Reagan listed them as:

First, the removal of all foreign military forces from Lebanon;

Second, the strengthening of the central government and the establishment of its authority throughout the country;

Third, Lebanon must not again become a launching pad for attacks into Israel....

Finally, I call on all parties in Lebanon to maintain the cease-fire so that diplomacy can succeed.¹⁹

On 20 September President Reagan discussed the return of the multinational force to Lebanon for a limited period of time. He spoke again of creating the conditions for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, assisting the Lebanese Government in regaining control of the capital city of Beirut as a precursor to gaining control of the entire country, and restoring a strong and stable government brought about by the constitutional process.²⁰

The 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit, along with French and Italian units, returned to Lebanon on 29 September 1982 as part of a multinational force requested by the Lebanese Government. The mandate for this second multinational force(MNF) included providing an interposition force to assist the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces in restoring authority over the Beirut area.

During the following months the United States concentrated its diplomatic efforts on bringing about the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. Attempts were made to arrange negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Lebanon and Syria, and Lebanon and the PLO.

The negotiations between Lebanon and Israel were designed to create conditions for Israel to withdraw the IDF from Lebanon with the knowledge that attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel would not be renewed.²¹

The Syrians based their presence in Lebanon on the mandate authorized by the Arab League in 1975. Negotiations between Syria and Lebanon to attain withdrawal of Syrian forces would require withdrawal of Israeli forces as a prerequisite.²²

Negotiations between Lebanon and the PLO would center on the removal of remaining PLO forces in Lebanon. This withdrawal could not be accomplished unless the Lebanese Government could provide security for the Palestinian civilians remaining behind.²³

The withdrawal of these foreign forces from Lebanon would leave a vacuum that would have to be filled by a stronger Lebanese army, capable of restoring the authority of the Lebanese Government over Beirut and the remainder of the country. Failure to address the legitimate security concerns of the nations involved would leave the problems unsolved and create conditions for the reentry of outside elements into Lebanon that would threaten the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of Israel.²⁴

U.S. efforts eventually brought about an Israeli-Lebanese agreement that included Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon with concurrent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Essential elements of the agreement included the requirements for withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces simultaneously with the IDF and termination of the state of

war. Known as the May 17 Agreement it was opposed by Syria and therefore not implemented. Failure of the Syrians to agree to withdraw left the Syrians and Israelis facing each other in the Bekaa Valley and the IDF only twenty five miles from the Syrian capital of Damascus. In response to this Syrian veto, President Gemayel notified the Arab League in June that the Arab Defense Force was no longer a legitimate force in Lebanon since it had been asked to leave by the Lebanese Government.²⁵

From September of 1982 to the middle of June 1983 the MNF had assisted the Lebanese Armed Forces in regaining control of Beirut. Security and safety had improved in Beirut, which included one third of Lebanon's population, and government forces had taken over administration of the ports. These improvements in Beirut were viewed with optimism and the hope that the central government could extend its authority throughout the remainder of the country.²⁶

In July and August violence began to escalate in and around Beirut, including artillery shelling of Christian areas by Syrian and Druze forces. Between June and August at least twenty car bombs were exploded in Beirut. By late August widespread fighting had spread throughout Beirut and its suburbs.²⁷

In September the Israelis began pulling their forces out of the Shouf Mountains, overlooking Beirut, and moved down south to reposition their forces in the vicinity of the Awali River. This vacated area in the Shouf Mountains immediately became a battleground involving the Druze, backed by the Shiites, Sunnis, and the Syrians opposing the Phalangist and the Lebanese Armed Forces. It was during the month of September that U.S. Navy warships fired in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces for the first time. The LAF were involved in a ground and artillery duel with the Druze, backed by the Syrians.

Intensified diplomatic efforts throughout the months of August, September, and October brought numerous cease-fires, negotiated by Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks. These cease-fires proved capable of lasting only a short period of time and were frequently used to reposition forces and conduct resupply of forces.²⁰ In September the U.S. Congress declared that the War Powers Resolution applied to the employment of U.S. forces in Lebanon and passed a resolution that authorized U.S. military presence in Lebanon for eighteen months.

Diplomatic efforts continued but the peace process appeared to be stalled. Syria had maintained that it would withdraw when Israel withdrew its forces and if the Government of Lebanon requested removal of Syrian forces.

However, Syria refused to negotiate or to heed the Lebanese Government's call for the removal of Syrian forces. This was partly based on Syria's contention that their forces were legitimately in Lebanon as part of the ADF. Syria did not want to be viewed in the same manner as the Israelis. It is entirely possible that Syria never intended to withdraw its forces until its own objectives had been met. While Syria may not desire to completely dominate Lebanon, there can be no doubt that Syria believes that Lebanon should remain within Syria's sphere of influence.

Events on 23 October 1983 were to place the situation in Lebanon in a completely different light for policy makers in the United States. On 23 October a bomb was exploded in the battalion headquarters of Battalion Landing Team 1/8 killing 241 American Marines, sailors, and soldiers.

Throughout the remaining time the MNF was deployed in Lebanon the President, Secretary of State, and members of the Department of State continued to address objectives, goals, and interests of the United States. Administration spokesmen took every opportunity to reinforce these objectives, goals, and interests. This was especially true during periods of heightened media interests such as the

terrorist attack on the United States embassy in April 1983 and the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team headquarters in October 1983. Although the MNF remained in Lebanon some months after this latter event, its situation was precarious.

In February 1984 the MNF was withdrawn from Beirut as the security in Lebanon deteriorated. The Marines remained in the area embarked aboard their amphibious shipping. In response to questions at a news conference on 22 February President Reagan addressed the current situation in Lebanon including the withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut:

We are redeploying, because once the terrorist attacks started, there was no way that we could really contribute to the original mission by staying there as a target just hunkering down and waiting for further attacks. So, the forces have been moved, redeployed - ours as well as others, and ours are going to be on the vessels offshore. But as long as there's a chance for a peaceful solution, we're going to try and see if there's any contribution we can make to achieving that.²⁹

On 5 March 1983 the Lebanese Government cancelled the May 17 Agreement with Israel under pressure from Syria. The withdrawal of the MNF left Syria as the dominant force in Lebanon and the Syrians acted quickly to consolidate their power. Syrian attempts to bring the separate factions under control proved as futile as others. New violence broke out in Beirut and throughout

Lebanon as the various factions vied for power in the absence of any legitimate central government.

Today Lebanon is still engaged in a search for answers to its internal problems. Lebanon is at war with itself, as it has been most of the time since 1975, still occupied by external forces, some of whom have no desire to see Lebanon as a free and independent nation with a strong central government. The United States continues to exert its influence in the area as much as possible through diplomatic channels.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

1. Alexander Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," Department of State Bulletin (July 1982): 44. Secretary of State Haig's address before the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, on May 26, 1982. Also listed as Press Release 177.
2. Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," 44.
3. Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," 44.
4. Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," 44.
5. Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," 44.
6. Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," 44.
7. Haig, "Peace and Security in the Middle East," 47.
8. Alexander Haig, "Interview on 'This Week With David Brinkley'," interview by Sam Donaldson, Sander Vancur, and George Will (ABC, 13 June 1982), Department of State Bulletin (July 1982): 55.
9. Alexander Haig, Department of State Bulletin (July 1982): 60. News conference held by Secretary of State Haig at the U.S Mission to the United Nations in New York on June 19, 1982. Press Release 203 of June 21, 1982.
10. Thomas Collelo, ed., Lebanon: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1987), 204.
11. "Maintaining a cease-fire in Lebanon," Department of State Bulletin (September 1982): 22. White House Statements of 2 August, 10 August, and 12 August 1982. Also President's Statement of 4 August 1982. Text is from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 9 and 16 August 1982.
12. "Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut," Department of State Bulletin (September 1982): 1 - 2. The text of the President's Statement was from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 23 August 1982.
13. "Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut," 2.

14. "Plan for the Departure From Lebanon of the PLO Leadership, Offices, and Combatants in Beirut," Department of State Bulletin (September 1982): 2. Made available to news correspondents by Acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

15. "Fact Sheet on the Departure," Department of State Bulletin (September 1982): 6. Made available to news correspondents by Acting Department Spokesman Alan Romberg.

16. "President's Letter to the Congress, August 24, 1982," Department of State Bulletin (September 1982): 8. Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the Senate.

17. Collelo, Lebanon, 296.

18. Robert Dillon, "Ambassador Dillon's Letter to Deputy Prime Minister Boutros," Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 51. Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes.

19. "President Reagan's Remarks to Reporters Following a Meeting With Ambassador Habib, September 8, 1982," Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 46 - 47. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of September 13, 1982.

20. "President's Statement, September 20, 1982," Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 48 - 49. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of September 27, 1982.

21. Kenneth W. Dam, "Securing a Peaceful Future for Lebanon," Department of State Bulletin (January 1983): 73. Address before the Chicago Law Club, Chicago, Illinois, on 2 December 1982. Mr. Dam was Deputy Secretary of State. Press Release 362 dated 6 December 1982.

22. Dam, "Securing a Peaceful Future for Lebanon," 73.

23. Dam, "Securing a Peaceful Future for Lebanon," 73.

24. Dam, "Securing a Peaceful Future for Lebanon," 73.

25. Nicholas A. Veliotis, "Middle East Policy Update," Department of State Bulletin (July 1983): 87 - 89. Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on 2 June

1983. Ambassador Veliotes was the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

26. See Nicholas A. Veliotes, "1983 Supplemental Request for Lebanon," Department of State Bulletin (May 1983): 65; Collelo, Lebanon, 206 - 210.

27. See George Shultz, "News Conference of August 31," Department of State Bulletin (October 1983): 37 - 40. News conference held by Secretary of State Shultz at the Department of State on 31 August 1983. Press Release 326; Collelo, Lebanon, 206 - 210.

28. Robert McFarlane was the President's personal representative to the Middle East and Richard Fairbanks III was special negotiator for the Middle East peace process.

29. President, "News Conference of February 22 (Excerpts)," Department of State Bulletin (April 1984): 2 - 3. Excerpts from President Reagan's news conference on 22 February 1984. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 27 February 1984.

CHAPTER 4

U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN LEBANON

What part were the Marines to perform in this strategy and how did the U.S. intend to accomplish its stated objectives?

The original Multinational Force inserted into Lebanon in August 1982 consisted of approximately 800 U.S. Marines, 800 French, and 400 Italian soldiers. The U.S. portion of the MNF was the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)¹ which was serving as a portion of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The MNF was deployed to Lebanon at the request of the Government of Lebanon. Tasked with operating in and around Beirut, forces of the MNF were positioned at locations agreed upon by the LAF and the national contingents of the MNF. The mission of the MNF was to assist the LAF in a safe and orderly evacuation of PLO and Syrian armed forces who were encircled by the IDF in Beirut. The MNF mandate also stated that the duration of the MNF would not extend beyond 30 days after arrival and that the MNF would leave sooner if requested by

the Government of Lebanon. Another provision stated that the MNF mandate would be terminated immediately and the MNF withdrawn in the event the evacuation of the PLO did not take place as scheduled.

The U.S. mission according the commander of the 32d MAU, Colonel James M. Mead, was to:

Support Ambassador Habib and the MNF committee in their efforts to have the PLO members evacuated from the Beirut area; occupy and secure the port of Beirut in conjunction with the Lebanese Armed Forces; maintain close and continuous contact with other MNF members; and be prepared to withdraw on order.²

The chain of command for U.S. forces was from the National Command Authority (NCA) through the normal command channel of European Command (EURCOM) in whose theater the operation was taking place.

The plan positioned elements of the MNF, collocated with LAF members, at locations to separate the IDF and Christian militia in east Beirut from the Syrian forces and the PLO located in west Beirut. On 21 August 350 personnel of the French MNF contingent deployed to Beirut to begin the evacuation of the PLO. The 32d MAU deployed approximately 800 Marines to Beirut beginning on 25 August. The majority of the Marine forces operated in the port area where the members of the PLO were embarking on ships for their departure from Beirut. The evacuation of the PLO and the Syrians was concluded on 3 September. The Marines

embarked on shipping beginning on 9 September and sailed for Italy to prepare for Operation Display Determination which was scheduled to begin on 25 September in Turkey.

The assassination of President-Elect Bashir Gemayel and the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps brought about the restoration of the MNF at the request of the Government of Lebanon. Ambassador Habib was responsible for working out the arrangements for deployment of U.S. forces as part of the MNF. Ambassador Dillon's note in response to the request by the Government of Lebanon was reviewed in the previous chapter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Alert and Execute Order was prepared once the decision was made to insert U.S. forces as part of the MNF and was transmitted to the Commander in Chief United States European Command (USCINCEUR) on 23 September 1983.

The JCS Alert and Execute Order for the "U.S. Force participation in Lebanon Multinational Force (MNF) Peacekeeping Operations" contained the mission statement and was drafted in coordination with USCINCEUR. The mission statement in the JCS Alert Order read:

To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the presidential Palace; be prepared

to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as required.

Additional mission-related guidance provided in the JCS Alert Order included the direction that:

The USMNF would not be engaged in combat.

Peacetime rules of engagement would apply (i.e. use of force is authorized only in self-defense or in defense of collocated LAF elements operating with the USMNF.)

USCINCEUR would be prepared to extract U.S. forces in Lebanon if required by hostile action.⁴

On 24 September CINCUSEUR sent an OPREP-1 message to Commander in Chief United States Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) which basically restated the above mission statement, provided a concept of operations, and designated Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 61) as the Commander, U.S. forces in Lebanon. The concept of operations conveyed the following:

...land U.S. Marine Landing Force in Port of Beirut and/or vicinity of Beirut Airport. U.S. forces will move to occupy positions along an assigned section of a line extending from south of Beirut Airport to vicinity of Presidential Palace. Provide security posts at intersections of assigned section of line and major avenues of approach into city of Beirut from south/southeast to deny passage of hostile armed elements in order to provide an environment which will permit LAF to carry out their responsibilities in city of Beirut. Commander U.S. Forces will establish and maintain continuous coordination with other MNF units, JCOM liaison team and LAF. Commander U.S. Forces will provide air/naval gunfire support as required.⁵

USCINCEUR tasked CINCUSNAVEUR to be prepared to conduct withdrawal operations in the event of hostile actions, provide air and naval gunfire support to forces ashore, and provide liaison teams to all members of the MNF and the LAF. The JCS modified USCINCEUR's concept of operations for CTF 61 on 25 September. The change replaced "deny passage of hostile armed elements" with "assist LAF to deter passage of hostile armed elements". CINCUSNAVEUR identified the initial positions that the Marines were to occupy ashore in Beirut. The Commander Sixth Fleet (CONSIXTHFLT) appointed CTF 61 as On-Scene Commander and Commander Task Force 62 (CTF 62) as Commander of U S. Forces Ashore Lebanon. CTF 62 was the 32d MAU commander.⁶

The Marines began deploying units ashore on 29 September 1982 to join French and Italian units of the MNF. The Marine landing was delayed until the 29th due to the failure of the IDF to meet one of the preconditions for the Marines to land. Before the Marines would land the Israelis had to be out of the area of responsibility assigned to the Marines and south of the airport. Another precondition arranged by Ambassador Habib was the guarantee by the Government of Lebanon that the various armed factions would not interfere with the MNF. Further assurances were that these armed factions would refrain

from hostilities and that the Government of Lebanon and the LAF would safeguard the MNF. Deputy Prime Minister Boutros' letter to Ambassador Dillon requested that the U.S. participate in the MNF following the events in the Sabra and Shatila camps. The letter included the mandate for the MNF and the conditions for its employment.

The mandate of the MNF will be to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This presence will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, and thereby further efforts of my Government to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement.

In the foregoing context, I have the honor to propose that the United States of America deploy a force of approximately 1200 personnel to Beirut, subject to the following terms and conditions:

Command authority over the American force will be exercised exclusively by the United States Government through existing American military channels.

The American force will operate in close coordination with the LAF.

In carrying out its mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.

It is understood that the presence of the American force will be needed only for a limited period of time to meet the urgent requirements posed by the current situation.

The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take all measures necessary to ensure the

protection of the American force's personnel, to include securing assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will refrain from hostilities and not interfere with any activities of the MNF.⁷

This second MNF was considerably expanded from the first. The U.S. Marine portion of the MNF consisted of approximately 1,200 Marines. The French contingent included 1,500 and the Italians provided forces numbering around 1,400. In January of 1983 the British provided a small contingent of about 100 men and the Italian contingent increased to 2,200.

Unlike the first deployment of the MNF where Ambassador Habib provided overall direction and specific taskings for the MNF, each contingent of the MNF conducted operations in their own sector based on guidance received from their own governments. Since no one was providing any overall direction and coordination no specific military assignments beyond military presence were identified.⁸

In the operational chain of command for the U.S. Marines as part of the MNF the MAU Commander was designated as Commander, U.S. Forces Ashore Lebanon and the Commander, Amphibious Task Force was designated as Commander, U.S. Forces Lebanon. The chain of command extended upward from the Commander, Amphibious Task Force to the Commander, Sixth Fleet then to CINCUSNAVEUR and finally to

USCINCEUR the theater commander. USCINCEUR received his taskings from the President and Secretary of Defense via the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The 32d MAU interpreted that their mission was to provide:

a presence in Beirut, that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to regain control of their capital. This mission required the 32d MAU to occupy positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport and establish and maintain close continuous liaison with the French, Italian, and Lebanese forces.⁹

Based on mission analysis, the MAU commander concluded that demonstrating U.S. intentions to support the government of Lebanon by establishing hasty defensive positions, collocated with the LAF, was required. The Marines established positions in the vicinity of the airport and began foot and motorized patrols in west Beirut. The Marines resolved to begin the foot and motorized patrols to satisfy the "presence" segment of their mission.¹⁰ The first casualties were suffered on 30 September when one Marine was killed and three wounded while clearing unexploded ordnance from the area of Beirut International Airport.

On 30 October 1982 the 32d MAU was replaced by the 24th MAU. In November the mission of the Marines was expanded to include both foot and mounted daylight

patrols. These daily patrols were conducted with the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and eventually expanded into east Beirut. In December the Marines began training a LAF rapid reaction force. The Government of Lebanon had requested the training and the JCS approved this request and passed the proposal to the Marines for planning. The proposed plan was submitted and approved by the chain of command in November.¹¹

In February 1983 the 32d MAU (redesignated the 22d MAU), commanded by Colonel Mead, replaced the 24th MAU. The 22d MAU continued to conduct patrols and to train the LAF. Some positions were shifted based on mission analysis and the political situation, which the battalion operations officer discerned had changed from the battalion's previous tour in Lebanon.¹² In March the 22d MAU Situation Report identified a rising terrorist threat as the diplomatic effort appeared to stall.¹³ Elements of the PLO were returning to Beirut and the Syrians had been rearmed by the Soviets. Throughout this period the Marine presence in Beirut was viewed either favorably or with indifference. During March this situation began to change.

An Italian mobile patrol was ambushed on 15 March and one soldier was killed and nine were injured. The following day five Marines conducting a foot patrol were wounded by a hand grenade thrown from a window. In April

the American Embassy was severely damaged by a car loaded with explosives and driven into the Embassy. The Marines took on the additional mission of providing security for the temporary locations of the Embassy and the Ambassador's home. In his Situation Report of 24 April Colonel Mead remarked on the current situation,

In spite of the terrorist threat, we are continuing to maintain a proper balance between our security and our presence/peacekeeping mission.¹⁴

In May the Israeli-Lebanese May 17 agreement was signed and the 24th MAU, commanded by Colonel Geraghty, replaced the 22d MAU. The Marines continued to send out patrols but due to the increasing hostilities the MAU commander requested that the LAF provide soldiers to accompany the patrols. On 25 June Marines and LAF began conducting combined patrols. In July two Marines and one sailor were wounded during the shelling of Beirut International Airport(BIA). On 8 August the Marines received a rocket attack at BIA. On the 10th another Marine was wounded during a rocket barrage. This attack was followed shortly thereafter by twenty seven 122mm rockets that struck the Marine positions. The Marines fired indirect fire weapons for the first time in response. The battalion's 81mm mortar platoon fired four

illumination rounds over the suspected 122mm rocket launcher location which silenced it temporarily.¹⁵

Throughout August hostilities continued to escalate among the various factions. The National Coalition Front¹⁶ which opposed the May 17 Agreement was battling the LAF and the Christian Phalange militia. In preparation for the withdrawal of the IDF from the Chouf and Alayh districts the LAF was attempting to strengthen its positions in these areas. The LAF was also battling the Amal¹⁷ militia in and around Beirut. Part of this fighting began to spill over into the Marine positions as the LAF and the Phalange traded indirect fire with the Druze and Amal. At the end of August the fighting became particularly heavy and the BIA area received over 100 rounds of indirect fire, both mortar and rocket.

On 28 August Marines exchanged small arms fire in a firefight at a combat outpost to the east of BIA after they were fired upon with small arms and rocket propelled grenades. The following day two Marines were killed and fourteen wounded during a heavy attack by rockets, artillery, and mortars. The Marines retaliated with artillery fire from their organic artillery battery. Following these events EUCOM suspended the requirement for patrols in Beirut. The 31st MAU was directed to move from the Western Pacific to the Mediterranean on 1 September by

the JCS in the event there was a requirement to reinforce the 24th MAU.¹⁸

The IDF began its withdrawal to southern Lebanon on 4 September which led to an increase in fighting in areas from which the Israelis had withdrawn. The LAF proved incapable of taking charge of the areas as the IDF withdrew. The Marines continued to receive indirect fire at BIA and between 4 and 7 September the Marine casualties were two killed and four wounded by the numerous rocket and artillery attacks. The USS Bowen responded with naval gunfire to a rocket attack on Marine positions on 8 September. This first use of naval gunfire in support of the Marines ashore added to the escalation of hostilities.¹⁹

Mid September brought a change to the situation in Lebanon as U.S. ships fired naval gunfire directly in support of LAF operations in the Shouf mountains. In one five hour period 360 rounds of naval gunfire were fired in support of the LAF.²⁰ This clearly changed the role of the U.S. to that of active support of the LAF.²¹ Several days of intense fighting occurred in and around the Marine positions prior to the cease-fire negotiated on 26 September by Ambassador McFarlane.

The cease-fire agreement quickly dissolved in October and on 14 and 15 October the Marines were involved in lengthy firefights. In one company position the volume of fire was so heavy that the Marines were unable to evacuate two of their wounded until late in the afternoon the following day. In a six day period the Marines suffered two killed and fifteen wounded.²²

23 October is the date most remembered about the Lebanon deployment. A truck loaded with explosives was driven into the headquarters building of 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment and destroyed the building killing 241 U.S. Marines, sailors, and soldiers and wounding another 70. The French MNF contingent received the same type of attack at almost the same time and suffered 58 killed.²³ This event seriously handicapped U.S. efforts for the remainder of the time the Marines were deployed in Beirut as the administration came under increasing pressure to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon.

Throughout November, December, and January the Marines continued to receive fire in their positions. In November and January the frequency of direct fire attacks escalated. On 4 December eight Marines were killed and two wounded in a rocket attack on Marine positions. This period was also marked by a steady increase in the use of naval gunfire and in December an air strike in Syrian

occupied Lebanon by twenty-eight U.S. combat aircraft. This last was in response to Syrian fire directed at U.S. aerial reconnaissance flights. In February the President announced his decision to redeploy the Marines aboard ship as the LAF steadily lost control of Beirut to the Druze and other rival militias.

On 21 February 1984 the Marines began to redeploy aboard ship and completed this action by 26 February. Approximately 100 Marines from the MAU remained ashore in Lebanon to provide security for the Embassy. A MAU remained off the coast of Lebanon and Marines from the MAU continued to provide external security for the American Embassy until 31 July 1984.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

1. A Marine Amphibious Unit (currently designated a Marine Expeditionary Unit [MEU]) was made up of a MAU headquarters, a reinforced infantry battalion, a composite helicopter squadron, and a service support group for logistic support. The MAU's deploy for six months at a time and are the amphibious landing force for the Sixth Fleet. The Marines have had an amphibious force in the Mediterranean since 1948. The infantry battalion is normally reinforced with an artillery battery, a reconnaissance platoon, a tank platoon, a platoon of assault amphibious vehicles, a combat engineer platoon, and additional communication assets.

2. James M. Mead, "The Lebanon Experience," Marine Corps Gazette 67 (February 1983): 33.

3. Department of Defense Commission, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Washington, DC: 20 December 1983), 39.

4. Department of Defense Commission, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 35 - 36.

5. Department of Defense Commission, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 36.

6. Department of Defense Commission, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 38 - 39.

7. Fouad Boutros, "Deputy Prime Minister Boutros' Letter, September 25, 1982," Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 50. Letter from Fouad Boutros, Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lebanon to Ambassador Dillon. This letter made available to news correspondents by Department of State spokesman John Hughes.

8. See Benis M. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982 - 1984 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), 31; and 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, After Action Report for Beirut, Lebanon Operation, 29Sep-1Nov82, dated 12 November 1982, Section II, 1.

9. 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, After Action Report for Beirut, Lebanon Operation, 29Sep-1Nov82, dated 12 November 1982, Section III.

10. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 23 - 25.

11. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 38 - 40.

12. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 50 - 51.

13. 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, "Situation Report Number 17," dated 27 March 1983.

14. 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, "Situation Report Number 21," dated 24 April 1983.

15. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 70 - 75.

16. A Syrian backed coalition opposed to the May 17 agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Also known as the National Agreement vice National Coalition Front in some works. Led by Walid Jumblatt, leader of one of the Druze factions.

17. The Amal was led by Nabih Biri (or Berri) and was based on the Shia movement to represent Shia interests. The Amal is the military arm of "The Movement of the Disinherited." However, there are numerous splinter groups within the Shia movement and the Amal. During this period a large portion of the Amal was supported by Iran and some elements were closely allied with Khomeini.

18. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 75 - 80.

19. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 85 - 86.

20. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 88. Naval gunfire support for the LAF was requested by the Lebanese Ministry of Defense via Ambassador McFarlane's JCS liaison officer in Beirut, Brigadier General Carl Stiner, USA. This request for support was based on Ministry of Defense reports of a two-battalion coordinated armor and infantry attack on LAF positions in the vicinity of Suq al Gharb by Palestinian units. The LAF artillery units were dangerously low on ammunition. A different viewpoint is taken by Thomas L. Friedman in his book, From Beirut to Jerusalem. Friedman maintains that McFarlane ordered Colonel Geraghty (MAU Commander) to request naval gunfire in support of the "endangered" Lebanese Army and that no attempt was made at independent confirmation of the LAF

assessment of their situation. Although Geraghty opposed the idea, he was overruled by McFarlane and Stiner. Friedman states that the next day the Americans learned that the LAF had only suffered eight killed and twelve wounded in the fighting. Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 200 - 201.

21. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 89. "Colonel Geraghty recognized that providing U.S. naval gunfire support to the LAF had changed the nature of his mission....Commenting on this matter in an interview conducted during his return home from Beirut in November 1983, he remarked:"

The firing we did in support of the LAF up at Suq al Gharb, that clearly changed our roles....It's a milestone, no question about it in my opinion. It moved us from a previous, very careful, razor edge line of neutrality that we were walking, and treating all the Lebanese communities alike....When we provided support...[to]the Lebanese up in Suq al Gharb, that, to me, moved it to a different category....

Additional information and viewpoints can be found in the Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, dated 20 December 1983, 42 - 43; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, 200 - 205.

22. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 150.

23. See Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut, 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983; Department of Defense, Report of DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, dated 20 December 1983.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

Why was the United States concerned with the events in Lebanon? The United States clearly viewed the crisis in Lebanon within the overall framework of the Middle East. From speeches by the President, members of the Department of State, and the Department of Defense it was clear that the Middle East was a region of vital strategic and economic importance for the United States and the freeworld. Additionally, the Middle East was an arena of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, the United States had committed itself to the security of Israel. For these reasons it was important that the United States maintain influence in the region.

A major focus of the efforts of the United States at this time was the potential for a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict via the Camp David accords. While the Camp David accords were not a peace settlement, they provided a framework for discussion to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Based on U.N. Security Council

Resolutions 242 and 338¹ the U.S. believed the Camp David accords provided the only viable route in the peace process between Israel and the Arab countries. Thus, maintaining the dialogue of the peace process through the Camp David accords was an essential regional objective.

A negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was not the only regional concern that elevated itself to a vital interest of the United States. Any Arab-Israeli conflict always threatened to involve the United States and possibly escalate into a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, although not necessarily a military confrontation.

Because of these factors the crisis in Lebanon became part of the broader policy of the United States in the Middle East. This was especially meaningful considering that Israel and Syria were two of the most important players in the Middle East peace process.

The regional considerations for United States intervention were: to prevent a war between Israel and Syria which could lead to a wider regional or international conflict and; to advance toward a peaceful solution in Lebanon which would contribute toward the broader peace process. Conversely, setbacks in Lebanon would make the peace process that much harder to manage and reduce chances for success.

The objectives of the United States in Lebanon were: the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon, a strong and stable central government capable of controlling events within its boundaries, and security for Israel's northern border so that it was free from attacks launched from within Lebanon. Several of these objectives were interlaced with each other or with other concerns.

The cessation of hostilities involved controlling the fighting between the various factions and the protection of unarmed civilians. Bringing an end to the violence between the many factions was the first step in allowing the Lebanese authorities to regain control of Beirut. An equally significant reason was the moral obligation the U.S. incurred during the PLO evacuation in August and early September. The Lebanese Government and the United States had guaranteed the safety of Palestinian non-combatants remaining behind in Beirut:

4. Safeguards. Military forces present in Lebanon--whether Lebanese, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, or any other--will in no way interfere with the safe, secure, and timely departure of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants. Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants left behind in Beirut, including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate guarantees of safety in the following ways.

The Lebanese Government will provide its guarantees on the basis of having secured assurances from armed groups with which it has been in touch.

The United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in touch.²

The United States recognized the responsibility it had accepted in the initial guarantee of safety for Palestinian civilians remaining in Beirut. Failure to accept this responsibility and provide for the safety of remaining Palestinians would have had a negative impact on any future diplomatic efforts.

The withdrawal of external forces was related to the other objectives yet neither Syria nor Israel were willing to withdraw without simultaneous withdrawal of the other, although Israel did eventually withdraw its forces to southern Lebanon. Syria and Israel both asserted that they had no territorial claim on Lebanon yet, neither appeared willing to negotiate a withdrawal of their forces. The question still remains whether Syria ever seriously considered withdrawing.³ It would be impossible for the Government of Lebanon to claim that it was in control when the majority of Lebanon, including the capital city, was under the control of external forces. A prerequisite for

the Lebanese government to gain control was the removal of all external forces from Lebanon.

A strong, sovereign Government of Lebanon capable of exercising authority throughout its territory required a political settlement between the government and the various factions and groups who were divided along confessional lines. A broader base of support for the government was mandatory for the government to extend its authority, however, the Gemayel government was unwilling to accept a more equitable distribution of power in the Lebanese Government. Neither was this objective possible as long as foreign forces controlled more of Lebanon than the central government.

Israel's northern border would never be secure as long as the Government of Lebanon was incapable of controlling Beirut, much less the rest of the country. Additional external forces, such as the PLO, were returning to Lebanon through areas that were not under control of the Lebanese Government or the IDF.

Confronted with these problems how did the United States intend to achieve these objectives? The strategy of the United States was outlined by Secretary of State George Shultz on 21 September 1982 in an interview on the Today Show:

The point in the Middle East is, first, to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon. That seems to be

coming to an end. The Marines and the multinational force are designed to help in that regard. Second, to get a stable central government in Lebanon, first, taking control of its own capital in Beirut, and then--promptly, strongly, and urgently--to clear Lebanon of foreign forces so that the country can be governed by its own government; to set to work on the basic peace process which must address the basic needs, problems, and aspirations of the Palestinian people. That's what our priorities must be.⁴

The interests, objectives, and strategy of the United States are summarized as follows:

National Interests

1. The Middle East was of vital strategic and economic importance.
2. The Middle East was an arena of competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
3. The U.S. was committed to the security of Israel.

Regional Objectives

1. Maintain U.S. influence in the region.
2. Maintain the dialogue of the peace process through the Camp David accords for a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
3. Reduce the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli conflict acting as a flashpoint and escalating into a U.S. and Soviet Union confrontation.

4. Demonstrate principled conduct regarding U.S. responsibility toward the Palestinian population remaining in Beirut.

U.S. Objectives in Lebanon

1. Cessation of hostilities.
2. Withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon.
3. Strong and stable central government capable of controlling events within its boundaries.
4. Security for Israel's northern border so that it would be free from attacks launched from Lebanon.

The strategy of the U.S. to accomplish these objectives was: to stop the fighting among the various factions allowing a stable Lebanese Government to take control and establish its authority over Beirut. This would create conditions conducive for the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces and enable the Lebanese Government to reorganize and establish its authority over the remainder of its territory. This would include training and reestablishing the Lebanese Armed Forces. One of the missions of this newly organized and trained LAF would be the protection of Israel's northern border.

What part were the Marines to perform in this strategy and how did the U.S. intend to accomplish its stated objectives?

The initial mission assigned the Marines was one of "presence" in order to establish an environment where the LAF could carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. The mission statement was modified four times. The first two changes dealt with the estimated number of IDF personnel in Beirut and defined the line on which the Marines were to occupy and secure positions. The third change, in November 1982, expanded the mission to include patrols into east Beirut. The final change, in May 1983, expanded the mission to allow Marines from the MNF to provide external security for the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.⁵

The tasks conducted to accomplish these missions included collocating Marines with LAF in defensive positions, conducting foot and motorized patrols, providing training for the LAF, and providing support to the LAF. A review of the original JCS Alert and Execute order along with statements from the President and members of the State Department will provide information to help identify the possible military objectives and missions in addition to the ones identified above.

First of all, the JCS Alert and Execute Order was entitled, "U.S. Force participation in Lebanon Multinational Force (MNF) Peacekeeping Operations." ⁶ This would clearly indicate a mission of peacekeeping for

the U.S. Marines of the MNF. Appearing on the "Today" Show on 21 September 1982 Secretary Shultz stated that the Marines would be in Lebanon to, "help the Government of Lebanon create stability and govern in the city of Beirut."⁷

Responding to questions only five days later on "Meet the Press," Assistant Secretary of State Veliotos made the following comments on the mission of the Marines:

The mission of the Marines is primarily to be a part of a three-nation force in Beirut which, by the presence of the Marines and this force, will give confidence to the Government of Lebanon and, thereby, facilitate the government's reestablishment of its authority throughout its capital city.

....and we would expect the Marines to fulfill their mission, which is essentially one of giving confidence, not only to the Lebanese but to the unarmed Palestinians and others in that area.⁸

On 29 September the President's Message to the Congress in compliance with the War Powers Resolution provides the following objective and mission for the 1,200 man Marine force as part of the MNF:

....the presence of which will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority, and thereby further the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.

Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces.⁹

On 21 September 1983 the Secretary of State, George Shultz, reiterated the role of the Marines in the MNF in a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. His comments were:

A year ago, President Reagan dispatched these Marines to participate in the multinational force requested by the Government of Lebanon. The presence of this force was designed to help ensure the Lebanese Government's sovereignty and authority; it was also intended to further that government's efforts to assure the safety of people in the area and to end the violence that had tragically recurred in the massacres of Sabra and Shatila.

....Its task is a peacekeeping mission, not a war-fighting mission. Its job is not to take sides in a war but, on the contrary, to help provide a sense of security for the legitimate Government of Lebanon as it pursues its national sovereignty and national unity.¹⁰

Returning to Chapter 1 for the definition of "mission," its key elements were: "a task, together with a purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor." Based on the information presented the military missions and objectives of employing the Marines in Lebanon are identified in the following paragraphs.

Peacekeeping was never actually assigned as a mission to the Marines although the JCS Alert and Execute Order contained "Peacekeeping Operations" in the subject line and as late as September 1983 Secretary of State Shultz was identifying the task of the Marines as a

"Peacekeeping mission." President Reagan's Message to Congress in compliance with the War Powers Resolution identifies their mission as an interposition force, which could be interpreted as a peacekeeping mission. There was no peacekeeping doctrine in 1982 for U.S. military forces nor was it taught at any of the service schools. The doctrine in use by most military forces for peacekeeping operations was the 1958 U.N. Peacekeeping Manual. In describing the task of the Marines as a peacekeeping mission Secretary Shultz did an excellent job of identifying some of the tenets of peacekeeping operations. Their job, as he described it was "not to take sides in a war but, on the contrary, to help provide a sense of security for the legitimate government."¹¹

The first mission assigned was "presence." The difficulty of defining this portion of the mission is evident. The Long Commission, convened by the Secretary of Defense following the terrorist bombing on 23 October 1983, focused on this aspect of the Marine deployment in its report. Throughout their deployments to Lebanon the Marines interpreted "presence" to mean providing a "visible" force. The task was to provide a presence and the actions in support of that task were to occupy positions along the designated line and collocate at security posts with the LAF and to conduct foot and

motorized patrols. The reason for the action was to assist the LAF in the deterrence of the passage of hostile armed elements and, finally, the purpose was: to allow the LAF to carry out their responsibilities in Beirut, to protect the noncombatants, and to bring an end to hostilities.

The expansion of the mission to include providing training to the LAF for a rapid reaction force in November 1982 was the first direct military support of the LAF. It was followed in August and September 1983 with U.S. support to the LAF through resupply of ammunition, from the MAU's ammunition stocks, and naval gunfire support while the LAF was engaged in combat with Druze and other factions in the Shouf Mountains.¹² The reason for this support was to assist the LAF in defeating these elements. The purpose is less easily identified since it fails to directly correspond to the limited objectives previously addressed. This expansion appears to be directed toward supporting the objective of facilitating the Lebanese Government's authority throughout Beirut and the surrounding area.

The final task assigned of providing external security for the U.S. Embassy was the result of the car bomb exploded at the embassy in April 1983. This had very little impact on the overall mission of the Marines in Beirut with regard to the political and diplomatic situation.

The missions assigned the Marines are summarized as:

1. Presence (provide a visible force)
2. Provide training to the LAF
3. Provide support to the LAF
4. Provide security for the American Embassy

The objectives of the mission and tasks can be summarized as follows:

1. Reaffirm U.S. commitment to Lebanon.
2. Assist the Lebanese Government in establishing peace and order along with maintaining stability.
3. Separate the IDF from the Lebanese and Palestinian population and assure the safety of the people in the area.
4. Help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese Government to regain control of Beirut.
5. Establish an environment where the LAF could carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area.

Did the employment of Marines and the missions assigned support stated U.S. regional objectives and objectives in Lebanon? A comparison of the missions assigned to the Marines with the stated U.S. objectives will be used to determine the answer to that question. The

mission of providing security to the American Embassy will not be included in this comparison.

U.S. Objectives in Lebanon

Cessation of hostilities. The presence of the Marines and the MNF initially provided a halt to the hostilities in Beirut. This was probably due more to the desire of the participants of the various factions that were fighting than the actual employment of the MNF. The employment of the Marines did signal a commitment on the part of the United States to achieving a peaceful settlement in Lebanon and was viewed with optimism by the Lebanese population. As later events were to prove, this force was not sufficient in size nor tactically positioned to enforce a peaceful settlement. One of the preconditions of the MNF mandate was that all factions agreed to refrain from hostilities. The employment of the Marines at checkpoints, collocated with the LAF, and conducting patrols helped separate the IDF from the population and protect the Palestinian population.

Once the diplomatic effort stalled and the various factions realized that the Gemayel government did not intend to loosen its grip on the government and create a more representative power base, hostilities started again. While the Marine force was large enough to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve in Lebanon it was insufficient to

actually enforce an end to hostilities. Thus, when fighting broke out between the LAF and the various militias the Marines, and the MNF, were powerless to bring an end to the fighting.

Providing training and support to the LAF did not assist in maintaining peace in Beirut or in bringing an end to hostilities once they had resumed. Like the Gemayel government, the LAF was viewed as a tool of the Maronite Christians and the Phalange Party. Frequently the Phalange militia fought beside the LAF, further alienating rival factions. Providing training and support to the LAF was perceived as siding with the Maronite Christians and increasing the power of President Gemayel and the Phalange.

The short term consequences of the employment of Marines separated the IDF from the civilian population and assured the safety of the people in the areas controlled by the Marines and the MNF. Additionally, the Marines bolstered the LAF at the checkpoints between areas to keep the various armed factions from crossing into rival areas in large numbers and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Lebanon. Overall the MNF was not large enough to actually act as an interposition force and separate combatants once they decided to resume fighting. Neither were the forces positioned on terrain that provided the ability to gain control.

Strong and stable government. The second objective of the U.S. in Lebanon was a strong and stable central government capable of controlling events within its boundaries. Two factors were critical for this to happen. First, the Gemayel government needed to create a broader base of support for the government by allowing a more equitable distribution of power. Secondly, a strong and stable government required the removal from Lebanon of the Syrians and the Israelis, both of whom exerted political influence and were involved in the internal decisionmaking process in Lebanon.

The employment of the Marines and their presence mission demonstrated U.S. commitment and contributed to the temporary peace discussed above. Further, the end to the fighting among the various factions provided the conditions for the Lebanese Government of Amin Gemayel to reach a political settlement between the government and these factions. The failure of the Gemayel government to accept a more equitable distribution of power meant that the government would not be able to extend its authority.

Providing training and support to the LAF did not contribute to the strengthening of the Lebanese Government since the LAF did not truly represent the Lebanese people. As long as the LAF was viewed as a tool of the Maronite Christians any training or support provided to the LAF was

viewed as taking sides. While a trained Lebanese army would eventually be required to accomplish the goals established by the U.S., it would need to be based on more representative lines than its current makeup.

The employment of the Marines with their mission of presence initially supported the opportunity for strengthening the Lebanese Government. Failure of the Gemayel led government to grasp this opportunity to negotiate a peaceful political settlement among the various factions meant a continued division along confessional lines. The expansion of the mission to provide training and support for the LAF worked against the objective of achieving a strong and stable central government. This was regarded as an attempt to prop up the Gemayel led government without any endeavor to solve the pre-existing problems. It also served to remove the U.S. and the Marines from their neutral position and placed them on the side of the Maronite Christians and the Phalange.

Withdrawal of external forces. The presence mission of the Marines and the temporary peace it contributed to provided the conditions for the withdrawal of Syria and Israel had either of those two countries desired to withdraw. Syria wanted to ensure its control over Lebanon and Israel wanted to make sure the PLO was incapable of mounting future assaults against it from

Lebanon. Although Syria publicly stated a willingness to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, a withdrawal would not have been in its perceived national interests. Initially Israel was not willing to withdraw until Syria withdrew. Once diplomatic efforts failed to convince Syria and Israel to withdraw, the presence of the Marines and the MNF did nothing to enhance that possibility.

Providing training and support to the LAF did not aid the diplomatic effort to encourage the Syrians and Israelis to withdraw. Aside from the initial end to violence brought about by the insertion of the MNF the employment of the Marines did not provide for accomplishing the objective of the withdrawal of external forces.

Security of Israel's northern border. The security of Israel's northern border was grounded in the ability of the Lebanese government to control events within its boundaries. This required a strong, stable central government along with a trained and effective Lebanese army. Once again, the presence mission of the Marines could assist in creating conditions that could lead to a stronger, more stable government and, ultimately a more effective military. However, this relied on the desire of the current Lebanese government to seek internal political settlement.

Providing training and support to the LAF would have supported achieving this objective if the LAF had enjoyed broader support among the Lebanese population. Since the LAF was unable to control events within the capital city of Lebanon it was certainly incapable of providing any type of security along the border between Lebanon and Israel.

The security for Israel's northern border, so that it would be free from attacks launched from Lebanon, would have to be considered a long term goal. Based on the situation confronting Lebanon in 1982 it would have been unrealistic to expect even a restructured and more representative LAF to control its boundary with Israel. In any event, the missions assigned to the Marines only partially supported achieving this objective and then only over a protracted time frame.

The employment of the Marines and the presence mission that was initially assigned supported the accomplishment of certain U.S. objectives in Lebanon. Principally, the employment of the Marines as part of the MNF demonstrated U.S. commitment to a peaceful settlement in Lebanon. By providing a visible force in Beirut the Marines and the MNF separated the IDF from the civilian population and assisted in maintaining some separation of the various militias and other factions fighting in

Beirut. The Marines and the MNF contributed to the cessation of hostilities in Beirut and helped create the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of the other U.S. objectives in Lebanon: withdrawal of external forces, strong and stable central government capable of controlling events within its boundaries, and security for Israel's northern border.

The employment of Marines and the presence mission could have assisted in the accomplishment of the other objectives of the U.S. in Lebanon as long as some progress in the diplomatic and political arena had been forthcoming. Failure to make headway on the diplomatic and political front hampered U.S. efforts to achieve stated objectives.

The expansion of the mission to include providing training and active support to the LAF failed to assist in achieving U.S. objectives. In fact, it probably hampered U.S. efforts by removing the mantle of neutrality the U.S. had outwardly attempted to maintain. Why and how the U.S. drifted toward the expansion of the original mission will be addressed in the final segment of this analysis.

It is equally important to compare the employment of the Marines and the missions they were assigned to stated U.S. regional objectives. It is possible to argue that the initial mission of presence assigned the Marines

more directly supports achieving U.S. regional objectives than objectives in Lebanon.

Regional Objectives

Maintain U.S. influence in the region. The employment of Marines in Lebanon and the mission of presence certainly signalled U.S. commitment to the region as well as Lebanon. By placing ground forces in Beirut as part of the MNF the U.S. was demonstrating its intent to take initiative in regional conflicts to prevent exploitation of these conflicts by the Soviet Union.

Maintain the dialogue of the peace process. The presence of the Marines, and the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Lebanon to which they contributed, assisted in promoting the conditions required for attaining this objective. Direct confrontation between the IDF and Syrian forces along with confrontation between the IDF and Palestinians in Beirut inhibited the peace process. Open channels of negotiation between Israel and Syria were essential to a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict via the Camp David accords.

Reduce the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli conflict. One of the major concerns of the U.S. was that a conflict between the Syrians and the Israelis could act as a flashpoint, escalating into a dangerous regional clash and possibly confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union. The insertion of the Marines in their presence role furthered a separation of the IDF and Syrian forces reducing the chance of escalation.

Demonstrate principled conduct. The U.S. responsibility for the safety of the Palestinian population remaining in Beirut was never publicly stated. However, the U.S. did voice concern for the safety of the Palestinian population following the events in the camps at Sabra and Shatila. The fact that the U.S. guaranteed the safety of the Palestinians remaining in Beirut following the evacuation of the PLO, and received assurances from Israel in this regard, never received large coverage in the Western press. Despite this fact, it was common knowledge in the Middle East and if the U.S. had failed to take any action it would have compromised the ability of the U.S. to conduct foreign policy in the Middle East. Thus, the insertion of the Marines as part of the MNF to assist in bringing an end to hostilities, along with separating the IDF from the Lebanese and Palestinian population, assisted in demonstrating responsible U.S. foreign policy. This ties in very closely with the first regional objective of maintaining U.S. influence in the area.

Initially, the employment of the Marines in Lebanon with their mission of presence supported the achievement of these objectives. While it is not possible to determine in

this work if a conflict between Syria and Israel would have escalated without the insertion of the Marines and the MNF, it is important to demonstrate that their employment fostered the achievement of the objective. It is reasonable to conclude that the insertion of the Marines did act to reduce the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli conflict. Their presence in Beirut also supported the regional objective of maintaining conditions for the advancement of the Middle East peace process desired by the U.S. The employment of the Marines also supported the objective of demonstrating principled conduct regarding the Palestinian population remaining behind in Beirut. Although the Marines may have initially supported the objective of maintaining influence in the region, the manner in which they were removed from Beirut probably did not serve that objective in the final analysis.

The next part of the analysis will determine if the political objectives established were sufficiently well defined in a manner that allowed them to be translated into military objectives and missions.

The political objectives of the U.S. in Lebanon were: cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon, a strong and stable central government capable of controlling events within its boundaries, and the security of Israel's northern border from attacks

launched in Lebanon. These objectives were clearly stated prior to the insertion of the Marines in September 1982. The U.S. repeatedly announced these objectives during the entire time the Marines were employed.

While the political objectives were clearly identified, military objectives were never clearly stated. The mission of the Marines was initially identified as one of presence. The Long Commission and others have argued that the Marines had no clear mission in Beirut, or the mission lacked specificity. While that may be partially true, the interpretation of presence to mean a "visible force" probably met the requirements of U.S. policymakers. What is missing are clearly stated objectives for the Marines or military forces. Earlier in this chapter an attempt was made to identify the objectives of the Marines and the following were identified: reaffirm U.S. commitment to Lebanon, assist the Lebanese Government in establishing peace and order along with maintaining stability, separate the IDF from the civilian population and ensure the safety of civilians, establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese Government to regain control of Beirut, and establish an environment where the LAF could carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area.

None of these objectives were unequivocally stated in the same manner as the political objectives. Neither was there any apparent attempt to create any linkage between a particular military and political objective. This failure to prescribe objectives for the Marines left their employment open-ended and precluded any possibility of defining success of the mission. A review of the military objectives identified exhibits their ambiguity and illustrates the difficulty in ascertaining their successful accomplishment. Additionally, it is unclear whether these objectives were to be accomplished solely by means of employment of the Marines or whether the Marines were to play a supporting role in their accomplishment.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

1. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 was passed in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and has been part of the basic foundation for efforts to reach a lasting peace in the region. Major points of the Resolution are:

Withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab areas.

An end to the state of belligerency between the Arab nations and Israel.

Acknowledgment of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every nation in the area.

The establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

Guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area.

A just settlement of the refugee problem.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 was adopted in October 1973 and called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and the alliance of Egypt and Syria. Major points of the Resolution are:

Calls upon all parties to cease firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts;

Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under the appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Resolution 338 was never fully implemented with regard to Egypt and Israel until the Camp David accords of 1977 when the Sinai was returned to Egypt and a peace formally negotiated. Resolution 338 has still not been fully implemented between Israel and Syria.

2. "Plan for the Departure from Lebanon of the PLO Leadership, Offices, and Combatants in Beirut," Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 49.

3. Syria's designs for Lebanon were discussed in Chapter Two.

4. George Shultz, "Interview on the 'Today Show'," interview by Bryan Gumbel and Marvin Kalb, (NBC News, 21 September 1982), Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 42. Press release 291.

5. Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Washington, DC: 20 December 1983), 37.

6. Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 39.

7. George Shultz, "Interview on the 'Today Show'," 43.

8. Nicholas Veliotis, "Assistant Secretary Veliotis Interviewed on 'Meet the Press'," interview by Bill Monroe, NBC News, and others (NBC, 26 September 1982), Department of State Bulletin (November 1982): 43. Nicholas A. Veliotis was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

9. "President's Message to the Congress, September 29, 1982," Department of State Bulletin (December 1982): 42. The subject of the message was the "War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in Lebanon." Identical letters addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President "pro tempore" of the Senate. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of October 4, 1982.

10. George Shultz, "U.S. Objectives in Lebanon," Department of State Bulletin (November 1983): 25. Secretary Shultz's statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 21 September 1983.

11. George Shultz, "U.S. Objectives in Lebanon," 25.

12. Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 42.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind how he intends to conduct it."¹ Or in the case of the employment of the Marines in Beirut, the use of military forces replaces war in the above quote from Clausewitz's On War.

This thesis has examined the employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon from 1982 through 1984 to determine if their use supported stated U.S. regional objectives and U.S. objectives in Lebanon. Chapter Five compared U.S. objectives in Lebanon and U.S. regional objectives with assigned military missions to determine if the employment of the Marines supported these objectives. This comparison was analyzed and the conclusions from this analysis are offered in the following paragraphs. Additional conclusions and recommendations are presented based on research conducted for Chapters Two, Three, and Four.

Based on the analysis conducted in Chapter Five, the employment of the Marines in Beirut did support stated U.S. objectives. The employment of the Marines and the MNF initially brought an end to hostilities in Beirut and separated the IDF from the civilian population. This provided the conditions for the Gemayel led government to reach a political settlement with its adversaries in Lebanon. However, while the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. were focused on negotiating the removal of Syrian and Israeli military forces, the underlying problem remained untouched. The primary barrier to a peaceful settlement in Lebanon was the unwillingness of the Gemayel led government to accept a more equitable distribution of power and thus achieve a broader base of support among the population.

Once the diplomatic and political efforts stalled, the employment of the Marines can be viewed as a hindrance to further developments. This includes the support and training provided to the LAF. As long as the U.S. was supporting the Gemayel government, President Gemayel did not feel the pressure to acquiesce to demands for developing a more representative government. Once the U.S. finally redeployed the Marines, President Gemayel found himself with insufficient means to negotiate a political settlement with other factions in Lebanon.

While the employment of the Marines in Beirut initially supported the accomplishment of U.S. regional objectives, eventually their employment must be viewed as unsuccessful based on the manner in which they left Beirut. Initially their employment demonstrated U.S. intent to maintain influence in the region, assisted in promoting peace in Lebanon, reduced the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli conflict, and demonstrated responsible U.S. foreign policy through protection of the Palestinians following the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. The manner in which the U.S. was forced to withdraw the Marines quite possibly reduced respect for U.S. influence in the region.

If the initial employment supported U.S. objectives but in the final analysis the employment is considered unsuccessful, is it possible to determine why? Two reasons are normally identified for the failure of U.S. military policy in Lebanon. The first is that the U.S. did not have clearly defined political objectives in Lebanon that could be translated into missions for military forces. The second is that the mission was never clearly identified. Based on the analysis of Chapter Five the conclusion reached in this study is that the political objectives were clearly defined in a manner that made translation into military objectives possible, and from these military objectives a clear mission statement derived. Although the

Marines were assigned a mission, which as far as can be ascertained they interpreted correctly, no military objectives were determined.

This lack of military objectives is the key to understanding the failure of U.S. military policy in Lebanon. The political objectives were clearly defined and, it is possible to argue, that the Marines were successful in accomplishing their assigned mission, that of presence. They did constitute a "visible force" in Lebanon. This indicates that the problem was not with the mission assigned but, that there were not clearly defined military objectives. This lack of military objectives allowed the U.S. to drift toward expansion of the original mission with no clear goal in mind. Long term success was sacrificed for short term gratification.

The failure to clearly define military objectives had several other effects. It would have been impossible for military or political leaders to determine the successful completion of the mission of the Marines in Beirut without any clearly defined military objectives. The ability of military planners to determine the size, composition, and mission of military forces is impossible without first determining objectives for that force. It is quite possible that once military objectives were established, military planners could have identified that

the planned force was not capable of accomplishing the intended objectives.

Fortunately, the renaissance of operational art has focused the U.S. military on the operational level of war. It is this inability to link the performance of military missions to the accomplishment of strategic political objectives that contributed to the failure of U.S. policy in Lebanon. The application of operational art would have greatly facilitated the ability of the U.S. military to contribute to the successful accomplishment of U.S. objectives in Lebanon and U.S. regional objectives or; allowed military decision makers to determine that military forces could not contribute to the successful accomplishment of political objectives.

The operational end state articulates the military conditions that must be established to support national strategic goals and thereby provides the ability to link tactical means and political ends. To reach these goals the operational end state must correspond to the political, diplomatic, and economic efforts. Strategic success is unlikely if the elements of national power; military, political, diplomatic, and economic are not closely coordinated. In On War Clausewitz noted the importance of the end state to the operational level of war

(his concept of strategy coincides with the current definition of the operational level of war):

The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it; he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.²

The operational end state not only guides all subsequent military actions, it provides the only means of defining success. After the operational end state has identified the military conditions that must be met to achieve the political objective, then an analysis can be conducted to determine the size and composition of forces necessary to achieve the desired end state.

From the operational end state operational objectives can be identified that will gain the desired end state and allow the development of a concept of operations. While the achievement of political objectives is the paramount objective of military forces, not all political objectives lend themselves to solution by use of military force.

Sometimes the political and military objective is the same--for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose....³

It will then be necessary for military planners and decisionmakers to determine if there is a military objective that will accomplish or facilitate the accomplishment of the political objective or; after a thorough analysis it may be determined that the use of military forces cannot support the accomplishment of political objectives. This latter determination being the most important conclusion to policymakers and frequently the least acceptable.

If the decision is made to employ military forces, the operational end state permits the concept of operations to be sequenced for suitable organization and application of resources to realize the desired end state. If the conditions change after military forces are employed, or the concept of operations does not appear to be achieving success, branches and sequels are utilized. A clearly articulated end state will identify the need to employ branches and sequels, allow the selection of the correct response, and provides a means of assessing risk.⁴

Movement away from traditional concepts of warfare creates a different set of problems for military decisionmakers as objectives and missions become more difficult to define. However, for precisely these reasons more effort must be expended to correctly identify a military end state that supports the accomplishment of the

political objectives. Otherwise, a situation will be created where the successful accomplishment by military forces of assigned missions may not produce the endstate desired, in fact, it may work to the detriment of accomplishing U.S. objectives. This inconsistency between the mission and the purpose for which it is conducted is normally the result of ambiguous objectives due to the absence of a well defined and articulated end state.

From the research conducted for this study, several other lessons can be identified. Many of these "lessons learned" have been incorporated in current doctrine since the events in Lebanon took place.

The need for a civil/military board to define and coordinate activities to ensure unity of effort and that military operations are contributing to the accomplishment of political objectives.

Recognition that "legitimacy" of the government is a prime concern in resolving conflict. This was ignored in Lebanon and the U.S. became identified with a government that the population perceived as representing a select group to the disadvantage of the remainder of the population.

The requirement for an overall commander to coordinate all military activities of all military forces assigned to an operation. This is the only effective

method to ensure that all military forces are contributing to establishing the military conditions required to achieve the political objectives.

Emphasize the requirement to constantly evaluate the situation, and as conditions change, change the concept of operations and objectives if necessary. A properly articulated operational end state will provide guidance for subsequent operations. The Marines were initially employed under conditions that stated that they would not engage in combat and that all armed elements would refrain from hostilities. Although the conditions changed the mission remained the same.

There were several alternatives available to policy makers when hostilities recommenced. If the Marines were supposed to be a "peacekeeping" force and their safety could no longer be guaranteed then they could have been withdrawn. If the operational end state desired was an end to hostilities, then military planners would be required to assess the size of the force required to achieve that end state. It probably would have been quite large. Following this assessment the U.S. could have inserted a force large enough to bring an end to hostilities, or decided it required too many resources and withdrawn the Marines.

The issue of U.S. military forces operating in a peacekeeping role while the U.S. is engaged in negotiations

requires additional study. While the Long Commission and others have attempted to identify a cause and effect between the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the use of naval gunfire in support of the LAF, the actual perception of the U.S. as a neutral party had probably already been compromised. When the U.S. negotiated the May 17 Agreement between Lebanon and Israel any previous hesitation about U.S. intent disappeared. By leaving Syria out of the negotiation process and failing to address Syria's vital regional interests and concerns the U.S. negotiated an agreement that Syria could never accept.

The mantle of neutrality was gone long before the U.S. demonstrated visible direct military support to the LAF. The May 17 Agreement was much more disturbing to Syria than any support to the LAF against Syrian backed forces. The question that requires study is whether the U.S. can be perceived as a neutral peacekeeping force while it is diplomatically involved in negotiations on its own behalf or on the behalf of a country with which the U.S. is closely associated.

The loss of prestige suffered by the U.S. in Lebanon is generally attributed to one of two factors: that U.S. policymakers erroneously used military forces; or, that the military forces lacked a clear mission. The conclusion of this study is that the initial employment of military

forces supported the accomplishment of U.S. objectives but that the lack of an operational end state led to an expansion of the original mission and an open ended use of military force that eventually hindered U.S. efforts. Additionally, U.S. efforts overall focused erroneously on peripheral matters in Lebanon while ignoring the primary issue of a government that refused to accept an equitable distribution of power and thereby gain a broad base of support.

Civilian policymakers establish termination objectives that designate a desired end state to conflict resolution and operational level commanders employ operational art to design military conditions that will realize that end state. Neglect of these key concepts of operational art will probably lead to a failure to accomplish established termination objectives.

CHAPTER SIX ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 579.
2. Clausewitz, On War, 177.
3. Clausewitz, On War, 81.
4. Frederick E. Abt, "The Operational End State: Cornerstone of the Operational Level of War" (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 30.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Numerous sources are available to conduct a detailed study of the Middle East and Lebanon. More literature is beginning to appear on U.S. policy in Lebanon since the 1975 - 1976 civil war. Limits to research are the classification of some government documents that deal with the U.S. intervention from 1982 - 1984. One of the cautions associated with any study of the Middle East is the prejudicial nature of a great many works, especially those that deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue.

For general background information on Lebanon, particularly the ancient period, Lebanon in History by Philip K. Hitti is the best place to begin. The modern period is addressed by David C. Gordon in The Republic of Lebanon. Helen Cobban's The Making of Modern Lebanon provides basic historical information but concentrates on government and political history of Lebanon. David C. Gordon provides insights into the factions and sects that make up Lebanon in Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation. This is by far the best discussion of the relationship between

the various factions within Lebanese society and Lebanon's government, and problems caused by those factions.

The area handbooks, prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies-Area Handbook Program, were used for background material on Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.

Lebanon: A Country Study and Syria: A Country Study were both edited by Thomas Collelo. Israel: A Country Study was edited by Helen Metz. Each area handbook describes the country and analyzes its political, economic, social, and government systems and institutions. These books generally contain the latest information on each country which makes them useful. One problem with these three area handbooks is that a mistake made in one is compounded in all three. Generally, the text prepared for Lebanon's relations with Syria and Israel, and vice versa, is written by the same author for all three books. Therefore, a mistake involving events in Zahlah that included Syria, the Phalange, and Israel is reported incorrectly in all three books.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies published Adelphi Papers 243 titled "Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict" by Hussein Sirriyeh. Concentrating on the conflict from 1975 to the present, the author discusses the central issues that divide Lebanon and identifies the heart of the controversy between the Palestinians and the

Lebanese. This work addresses how Lebanon became entangled in regional issues with Syria, Israel, Iran, and the PLO. Its focus is on Lebanon's weakness as a nation state.

Two works that address U.S. intervention in Lebanon are "Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System," a MMAS Thesis by Nassib S. Eid and Roger J. Spiller's Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon." Nassib provides an overview of Lebanon's history from ancient times to the late 1970's and examines U.S.-Lebanese relations. He places a heavy emphasis on Lebanon's independence and history as a western-style democracy. Dr. Spiller analyzes the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon from the standpoint of contingency operations. His work covers not only U.S. policy toward Lebanon during this period but succinctly discusses the crisis in Lebanon and the causes and events leading to that crisis. The uncertainties faced by military forces ashore and the necessity to correctly identify the threat and the appropriate countermeasures demonstrate the need for adaptability in these types of operations.

An excellent reference for political, diplomatic, national security, and military information is The War for Lebanon, 1970 - 1985 by Itamar Rabinovich. Thorough coverage of the 1975 - 1976 civil war in Lebanon and the

civil unrest leading up to 1975 and civil unrest that followed the civil war is provided. Rabinovich examines the interests of all the players in Lebanon, both internal and external. He also provides a concise history of relations between the Phalange Party of Pierre Gemayel and Israel starting in the 1970's and leading to the Israeli intervention at Zahlah. Professor Rabinovich deals with Israel's foreign policy regarding events in Lebanon and national security strategy leading to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982. Although he covers military operations, Professor Rabinovich is best at discussing the possible reasons for the IDF exceeding the original 40 kilometer limit into Lebanon.

The best discussion of the 1982 Israeli invasion and its aftermath, particularly the military operations, is 40Km Into Lebanon, a National Security Affairs Monograph by Thomas Davis. Not only does Davis give a thorough review of Israeli military operations but he covers the political considerations and objectives. His monograph also provides a concise history of Lebanon along with the strategic concerns of the regional actors.

Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Thomas L. Friedman's From Beirut to Jerusalem captures the senseless violence and the "tribe like" politics of the region. Friedman was the New York Times Bureau Chief in Beirut

from 1982 - 1984 and then became the New York Times Bureau Chief in Jerusalem. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1983 for his coverage of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camps. His discussion of the personalities involved, with anecdotes, furnishes an overall feeling for the region. He provides insight into Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad and Syrian interests, discusses Yasir Arafat and the evolution of the PLO, and delves into domestic Israeli politics following the 1982 invasion. Although he also discusses the U.S. Marine presence in Lebanon, the most important part of the book is his discussion of the events in the Sabra and Shatila camps.

The only authoritative account on Marine operations in Lebanon is U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982 - 1984 by Benis M. Frank, published by the History and Museums Division of the U.S. Marine Corps. This account was written using primary source documents and oral interviews conducted by the author as the head of the Marine Corps Oral History Program. As the author states, this "is a straightforward account of the deployment of Marines to Lebanon...." Frank makes few attempts to discuss diplomatic or political efforts nor does he attempt to draw any conclusions. He sticks to his stated purpose, "This is simply the story of

the Marine Corps presence and operations in Lebanon for the period concerned."

The bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut in October 1983 is covered by Benis Frank in U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982 - 1984 and many others. Almost all quoted extensively from the Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 1983 or the U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut.

In Fighting for Peace by Caspar Weinberger, the former Secretary of Defense makes his case publicly that he argued against the initial employment of a military force incapable of interposing itself as a peacekeeping force between withdrawing Syrian and Israeli forces. This mission was further frustrated when the Israelis and Syrians failed to withdraw. Weinberger also identifies the Israeli objective as the eradication of the PLO army. He discusses Habib's promise in August to departing PLO members that Israeli forces would not reenter Beirut and threaten families of Palestinians. Finally, Weinberger attacks the May 17 agreement as useless because of Syria's ability to veto.

Two works that deal with national security and the use of military forces are American National Security:

Policy and Process by Jordan, Taylor, and Korb and;

"Ethics and American Power: Speeches by Caspar W. Weinberger and George P. Shultz" published by the Ethics and Public Policy Center. American National Security deals with the formulation and implementation of U.S. national security policy and the role of the military in the national security process. "Ethics and American Power" includes the now well known speech by Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power" and concludes with the six tests for the use of military power. Two weeks after Weinberger's speech Secretary of State George Shultz gave a speech in New York on "The Ethics of Power." He addressed three tests for the legitimate use of power. This 1984 discussion addressed the problem of military power and under what circumstances it should be used. These speeches were an outgrowth of long running differences between Weinberger and Shultz over the employment of the Marines in Beirut. These two different viewpoints on the use of military power are still being argued today.

Numerous articles have been written that have identified that U.S. policy in Lebanon failed and that the U.S. suffered a loss of prestige in the Middle East because of that failure. Most accounts focus on either the military or foreign policy aspect. Unfortunately, a majority of the works on the military deal strictly with

military operations and tend to fixate on the bombing of the Marine headquarters in October 1983. Other articles and books deal with Marine operations and identify the failure of the chain of command or the lack of a clear mission. What appeared to be lacking in all these studies was any attempt to compare the stated objectives of the United States with the actual employment of military forces. Acknowledging that military forces only have utility as long as they serve to accomplish political objectives, this study was undertaken to fill what the author perceived as a void in the field.

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